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Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really 
Regulating Hedge Funds? 
Jeremy Kidd, J.D., Ph.D.* 
Abstract 
Influential scholars of corporate law have questioned previous 
federal interventions into corporate governance, calling it quackery. 
Invoking images of medical malpractice, these critiques have 
argued persuasively that Congress, in responding to crises, makes 
policy that disrupts efficient private rules and established state 
laws. This Article applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to 
show that Dodd–Frank’s hedge fund rules are more than just 
negligent or reckless, but designed to benefit special interests that 
compete with the hedge fund model. Those rules offer no solutions 
to any real or perceived risks arising from hedge fund investing, but 
might offer an advantage to competitors of hedge funds. 
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I. Introduction 
On February 3, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an 
executive order, entitled “Core Principles for Regulating the 
United States Financial System,”1 described by then Press 
Secretary Sean Spicer2 as part of an intended effort to rescind some 
                                                                                                     
 1. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,965 (Feb. 3, 2017).  
 2. See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, 2/3/2017, #8, WHITE 
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of the provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).3 Dodd–Frank is viewed 
by many as “a disastrous policy”4 for our financial markets and our 
economy, but what makes it disastrous? Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge has argued that Dodd–Frank’s corporate governance 
regime is quackery, an ineffective remedy that could even cause 
harm.5 This paper argues that the quackery may extend to Dodd–
Frank’s hedge fund regulations, as well. The paper then goes one 
step further and argues that things may be even worse, that Dodd–
Frank’s regulatory regime may be the work of bootleggers.6 
Quackery would be bad enough, as the term conjures images 
of bloodletting, lobotomies, leeches, glysters,7 and the like. These 
were all once respected medical practices, yet the passage of time 
has revealed that they were not only useless as medical remedies, 
but often far more likely to kill or injure the patient than the 
apparent malady being “cured.”8 Other supposed remedies—snake 
                                                                                                     
HOUSE OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (Feb. 3, 2017, 12:37 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-
sean-spicer-020317/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Press Briefing] 
(“Dodd–Frank has been both a disaster in terms of the impact that it’s had, but 
also it hasn’t achieved the goal . . . I think we’re going to continue not just to act 
through administrative action, but through working with Congress and figuring 
out a legislative fix.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd–Frank”]. 
 4. See Press Briefing, supra note 2 (“The Dodd–Frank Act is a disastrous 
policy that’s hindering our markets, reducing the availability of credit, and 
crippling our economy’s ability to grow and create jobs.”). 
 5. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2011) (“Dodd–Frank is to 
corporate governance as quackery is to medical practice.”). Bainbridge adopts the 
language used by Roberta Romano in describing Sarbanes–Oxley as “quack 
corporate governance” in her Article titled, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter 
Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance]. 
 6. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a 
Regulatory Economist, REGULATION, May–June 1983, at 12, 13 [hereinafter 
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists] (describing Bootleggers and Baptists theory). 
 7. A glyster involved the use of a bellows to introduce tobacco smoke into 
the lower bowels of the patient. MICHAEL C. MUNGER, THE THING ITSELF: ESSAYS 
ON ACADEMICS AND THE STATE 4 (2015). 
 8. See id. (“Not surprisingly, people thought that fevers were deadly, and to 
be fair, fevers really were deadly . . . if someone panicked and called a doctor to 
370 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367 (2018) 
 
oil,9 miracle salves,10 etc.—have always been recognized for the 
frauds that they are by most individuals in the United States. 
These forms of quack medicine seem absurd today, yet many 
homeopathic remedies without any evidence of effectiveness 
continue to plague desperate patients seeking a cure for what ails 
them.11  
The same can also be said of much of our legal and regulatory 
regime. Bainbridge and Romano argue that federal attempts at 
regulating corporate governance, an issue normally left to state 
legislatures and courts, shares the characteristics of quack 
medicine.12 There are reasons to be skeptical of the effectiveness of 
federal regulation, particularly as responses to crises when 
political pressures are high and a sense of caution may be a 
political liability.13 Whether acting on their own mistaken theories 
or those of outside “experts,” solutions crafted in the wake of a 
major economic or political event are likely to have the 
                                                                                                     
do something.”). 
 9. See Lakshmi Gandhi, A History of ‘Snake Oil Salesmen,’ NPR: CODE 
SWITCH (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/ 
2013/08/26/215761377/a-history-of-snake-oil-salesmen (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) 
(noting that snake oil was effective in China but became a symbol of fraud when 
entrepreneur Clark Stanley attempted to introduce replicate oils to the United 
States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10. See Ben Tinker, FDA Cracks Down on ‘Illegal’ Cancer Treatments, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/25/health/cancer-treatments-illegal-fraudulent-
misleading-fda/index.html (last updated Apr. 25, 2017, 10:00 PM) (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2017) (listing Hawk Dok Natural Salve LLC, a company that claims it 
found a natural way to fight cancer and HPV, as one that received a warning 
letter from the FDA because the product could be unsafe and/or prevent someone 
from seeking life-saving treatment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. See id. (referring to the fear and desperation that may tempt individuals 
to try a product that claims to cure a disease, but that “if something seems too 
good to be true, it probably is”). 
 12. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1801 (referring to the “unique foibles of 
Dodd-Frank’s provisions” and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as quack corporate 
governance (citing Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2015))).     
 13. See id. at 1794 (“[U]nlike state law, federal intrusions typically have 
resulted in quack corporate governance. We have already seen three reasons why 
this is so persistently the case. First, federal bubble laws tend to be enacted in a 
climate of political pressure that does not facilitate careful analysis of costs and 
benefits.”). 
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characteristics of quackery.14 Legislators and regulators might 
prescribe the legal version of a glyster or bloodletting, making the 
patient—the U.S. economy—even worse off than the crisis itself. 
When it comes to hedge fund regulation under Dodd–Frank, 
the metaphor may also apply. The regime addresses a 
minor-to-nonexistent problem and does so in a way virtually 
guaranteed to do nothing to remedy any perceived problems.15 
Applying Bruce Yandle’s Baptists and Bootlegger theory,16 the 
Article questions whether the impending “failure” of Dodd–Frank 
is by design. Specifically, the Article investigates how the very 
provisions that guarantee failure of the regime’s stated goals might 
be perfectly designed to achieve more subtle goals of certain 
powerful-but-hidden interests.17 In other words, whether hedge 
fund regulations were designed by well-intentioned but 
incompetent quacks or sophisticated, rent-seeking bootleggers. 
Section II will review the quackery metaphor as introduced by 
Romano and Bainbridge and then generalize its terms.18 Section 
III will then discuss the Bootleggers and Baptists theory and how 
it explains government regulation that fails its stated goals but 
may achieve additional, unstated ones.19 The rest of the Article will 
then analyze the regulation of hedge funds under Dodd–Frank. 
Section IV will briefly describe how hedge funds fit within financial 
markets,20 followed in Section V by a discussion of how Dodd–
                                                                                                     
 14. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1528 (regarding Sarbanes–Oxley Act as an “emergency legislation, enacted under 
conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving several 
high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases . . . in conjunction with an 
economic downturn, [and] what appeared to be a free-falling stock market”). 
 15. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1821 (“A powerful interest group 
coalition centered on activist institutional investors hijacked the legislative 
process so as to achieve longstanding policy goals essentially unrelated to the 
causes or consequences of the financial crisis that began back in 2007.”). 
 16. See Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13 (describing 
Bootleggers and Baptists theory).  
 17. See infra Part III.A (analogizing the Bootlegger prong of the Bootleggers 
and Baptists theory with Dodd–Frank, whereby regulation addressing a failure 
can also benefit private interests). 
 18. See infra Part II (describing the Bootleggers and Baptists theory and 
extrapolating general principles). 
 19. See infra Part III (connecting general principles in Part II to regulation). 
 20. See infra Part IV (providing financial background for the remainder of 
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Frank and its regulation of hedge funds came to be.21 Section VI 
then takes a critical look at whether Dodd–Frank’s goals have 
been—or even can be—achieved through its regulation of hedge 
funds.22  
After concluding that Dodd–Frank stands little chance of 
achieving its public goals, Section VII applies the Bootlegger and 
Baptist theory to identify those third parties who might benefit 
from the particular regulatory regime adopted by Dodd–Frank: 
large traditional investment houses who stand to gain by removing 
a competitive advantage previously enjoyed by the now-regulated 
hedge funds; and larger hedge funds who can more effectively 
defray compliance costs than their smaller competitors.23 
Concluding thoughts and ideas for further inquiry are then offered 
in Section VIII.24 
II. The Quackery Critique 
Quacks, like confidence men, are different from thieves 
because the victim voluntarily hands over whatever the quack or 
con man requests.25 It is even possible that the quack believes his 
own marketing.26 Irrespective of the intent of the quack or con 
                                                                                                     
the Article). 
 21. See infra Part V (outlining the origins on Dodd–Frank). 
 22. See infra Part VI (looking at the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of 
regulation attempting to actualize Dodd–Frank’s purpose).  
 23. See infra Part VII (applying the Bootleggers and Baptists theory to 
Dodd–Frank). 
 24. See infra Part VIII (summarizing the Article’s conclusions and areas for 
further analysis).  
 25. See Jean Braucher & Barry Orbach, Scamming: The Misunderstood 
Confidence Man, 27 J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 250 (2015) (“The trusting victim literally 
thrusts a fat bank roll into [the confidence man’s] hands. It is a point of pride with 
him that he does not have to steal.” (quoting DAVID MAURER, THE BIG CON 1 
(1940))). 
 26. One author proposes three types of quacks: (1) the “dumb quacks” who 
know nothing about the remedies they are creating but persist in their creating; 
(2) the “deluded quacks” whose medical knowledge is limited and whose 
observations and conclusions are flawed; and (3) the “dishonest quacks” who 
know they are perpetrating a fraud but care more for the money they make. Note, 
Quackery in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 265, 267 (1959). 
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man, there is still harm caused; the victim of a con is fraudulently 
deprived of something of value and a patient who receives 
treatment from a quack pays for non-treatment and may even 
delay real care until it is too late.27 Those likely to be taken in by 
con men and quacks are typically those with little faith in 
traditional methods and desperate for a miracle.28 They are more 
likely to be easily distracted by grand promises and sophisticated 
explanations for why traditional methods will fail.29 While sham 
remedies in the medical field may have dwindled since the 
nineteenth century,30 they appear to be ascendant in the 
regulatory field, particularly with regard to financial regulation 
and corporate governance.31 Two prominent examples are the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 200232 (SOX) and Dodd–Frank. 
A. Quacks in SOX 
Congress passed Sarbanes–Oxley in the aftermath of the 
Enron and Worldcom debacles and in the lead up to the 2002 
                                                                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Katharine A. Van Tassel, Slaying the Hydra: The History of 
Quack Medicine, the Obesity Epidemic and the FDA’s Battle to Regulate Dietary 
Supplements Marketed as Weight Loss Aids, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 203, 213 (2009) 
(describing how obese individuals forego beneficial lifestyle changes and 
treatments because they believe a weight loss supplement will resolve their 
weight issues). But see W. John Thomas, Informed Consent, The Placebo Effect, 
and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 313, 313–15 (2001) 
(relating anecdotes of terminal patients whose lifespans were incredibly extended 
because they believed in the curative effects of placebos). 
 28. See, e.g., Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 205 (“Overweight consumers 
desperate to lose weight are being lured by ‘magic bullet’ claims into purchasing 
‘quick-fix’ weight lost supplements in order to lose weight and decrease their risk 
for disease.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Quackery in California, supra note 26, at 267 (referring to a 
quack’s victim as “hopeless” because proven medical aid is insufficient, or “miracle 
seekers, who are taken in by glittering promises”). 
 30. See Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 219 (“[T]he nineteenth century was 
known as the ‘grand era of the quack remedy.’” (quoting PHILIP J. HILTS, 
PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
REGULATION 23 (2003))). 
 31. See generally Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra 
note 5 (referring to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as quack governance in her 
title).  
 32. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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mid-term elections.33 It was a large and complicated piece of 
legislation and included, among other things, numerous provisions 
related to corporate governance,34 including some that changed the 
boundaries of separation between federal and state regulation of 
corporations.35 Shifting the balance of power in corporate 
governance regulation by way of substantive rules was both 
unnecessary and wasteful because the substantive rules could 
have been formulated as disclosure requirements, traditionally 
within the realm of federal law.36 Doing so would have maintained 
the existing balance between federal and state regulation and 
limited the significant increases in costs of compliance.37 
It is possible for laws to be enacted and regulations to be 
promulgated in error, especially in the wake of a crisis and even 
more so in an election year, as every politician will feel pressure to 
do something—however ill-advised that something might be.38 
                                                                                                     
 33. Both companies entered bankruptcy proceedings after revelations that 
they engaged in fraudulent accounting practices and self-dealing by executives. 
Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1523. 
 34. See id. at 1527 (noting that various provisions required corporations to 
establish independent audit committees, restricted their purchasing non-auditing 
services from the firms hired to perform audits, prohibited loans to corporate 
officers, and mandated that executives certify financial statements). 
 35. See id. (“[T]he substantive corporate governance provisions overstep the 
traditional division between federal and state jurisdiction, although they did not 
have to do so.”). Given the crisis in which it emerged, it is not surprising that 
Sarbanes–Oxley also included items that were completely unrelated to the 
perceived crisis, such as the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81 (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 2 and 26 U.S.C.). 
 36. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1528 (calling the choice of regulatory form under Sarbanes–Oxley “more costly”). 
Professor Romano turned out to be correct. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. 
Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1645–46 (2007) (“First-year 
implementation costs for larger companies were thus eighty times greater than 
the SEC had estimated, and sixteen times greater than estimated for smaller 
companies.”). 
 37. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1781 (“When SOX was adopted neither 
Congress nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) appreciated just 
how costly it would prove . . . . The direct cost of complying with section 404 in its 
first year [was] $7.3 million for large accelerated filers and $1.5 million for 
accelerated filers.”). 
 38. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1600 
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What made Sarbanes–Oxley particularly troubling, however, is 
that the proposed changes were known to stand very little chance 
of success.39 
1. The Snake Oil 
As cataloged by Romano,40 what was known about these 
proposals weighed heavily against any likelihood of success. On 
the requirement of independent audit committees, ten out of 
sixteen then-existent studies on the subject found no link between 
independence of audit committees and performance of those 
committees.41 This is in keeping with the consensus that 
independent boards, generally, do not improve performance and 
might even have a negative impact.42 More importantly, the one 
factor that was known at the time to have a positive impact on 
audit committee performance—having a committee member with 
financial expertise—was not mandated by Sarbanes–Oxley.43 In 
                                                                                                     
Congress cannot be expected to take no action in times of financial 
exigency given the election cycle. Retaining one’s public office is an 
understandably powerful motivating force, and financial crises are 
often accompanied by a media frenzy . . . that plays into public 
discontent and generates expectations of government solutions. 
 39. See id. at 1585 (“The contention from a symbolic politics perspective is 
that despite the mandates’ known probable ineffectiveness, their enactment 
provided an expressive or symbolic benefit: Congress’s demonstration to a 
concerned public that it was remedying a serious problem.”). 
 40. See id. at 1529–43 (describing the main SOX mandates). 
 41. Id. at 1532. 
 42. See id. at 1530 (“[I]ndependent boards do not improve performance 
and . . . boards with too many outsiders may, in fact, have a negative impact on 
performance.”); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain 
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 
921, 942–45 (1999) (summarizing the literature on Board independence and firm 
performance); Julie Cotter & Mark Silvester, Board and Monitoring Committee 
Independence, ABACUS, June 2003, at 211, 228–29 (finding no relation between 
independent audit committees and firm performance). 
 43. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1532 (“[C]omplete independence is less significant than [financial] expertise with 
respect to the relation between audit committee composition and accounting 
statement quality. These results are notable in that SOX does not mandate the 
presence of a financial expert on the audit committee.”). 
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other words, a possible cure was ignored while Congress mandated 
a remedy that had no empirical foundation. 
This same pattern holds true for other substantive changes. 
Sarbanes–Oxley banned the purchase of certain non-audit services 
from the same firm that was conducting the audit.44 However, 
fifteen of twenty-five studies to address the question found no 
connection between purchase of non-audit services and the quality 
of the audit, and three found that the quality of the audit is 
actually improved when non-audit services are purchased.45 
Moreover, the studies that found no connection also used the most 
sophisticated techniques and were the most robust,46 improving 
the confidence that an objective observer would have in trusting 
those conclusions and rejecting the claims of Sarbanes–Oxley 
proponents. 
Sarbanes–Oxley also banned extension of credit by 
corporations to their executives, a provision that played well for 
Congress and the public.47 In reality, this was a single tool of many 
that corporations used to compensate their officers and directors, 
                                                                                                     
 44. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201. 
 45. Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1535–
36. One study found no connection as long as the auditing firm was one of the Big 
Five accounting firms. Id. at 1536. But see Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation 
Between Auditors’ Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management, 77 
ACCT. REV. 71, 100 (2002) (finding a negative relationship between purchase of 
non-audit services and quality of the audit). However, as noted by Romano, 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1537, subsequent 
studies have cast doubt on the validity of the Frankel study. Ribstein also points 
out that this provision reduces the incentive to use large auditing firms who can 
offer a wide range of services and who—not coincidentally—have far more to lose 
if they engage in unethical behavior. See Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. 
L. REV. 77, 88 (2003) (“[I]ncreasing auditor independence may reduce their access 
to information as well as their expertise, ability and incentives.”). This provision 
could actually increase the amount of bad behavior by auditors. 
 46. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1537 (claiming that this conclusion is not only compelling “because it is the 
finding of the vast majority of studies but also because it is the result of the 
studies using the most sophisticated techniques, as well as those whose findings 
are most robust to alternative model specifications”). This was also true of those 
studies that found no connection between independence of the audit committee 
and the outcome of the audit. See id. at 1533 (concluding that these studies are 
also compelling and used sophisticated techniques). 
 47. See id. at 1538 (“Section 402(a) of SOX prohibits corporations from 
arranging or extending credit to executive officers or directors.”). 
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and taking away compensation tools makes the already 
complicated job of crafting an efficient compensation package even 
harder.48 Because corporations must compete in the market for 
corporate executives, they will craft a compensation package that 
achieves the desired end—optimum corporate performance, for 
example—at the lowest possible cost.49 A rule that bans the use of 
specific compensatory tools is guaranteed to increase the total cost 
of compensation.50 Prior to Sarbanes–Oxley, the practice of 
extending credit to executives—often so that executives could 
purchase corporate stock—was thought unobjectionable so there 
was no empirical research on its effect.51 One study was conducted 
in the wake of Sarbanes–Oxley, and the results were consistent 
with the conventional wisdom that this practice was designed to 
improve alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ incentives.52 
Sarbanes–Oxley also required that executives certify financial 
statements, although this was not entirely new,53 and the data is 
inconclusive regarding its effectiveness.54 Note, however, that of 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. (“The blanket prohibition has engendered concern among 
practitioners, because it appears to prohibit standard compensation practices 
thought to be uncontroversial and beneficial, such as the purchase of split-dollar 
life insurance policies.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99, 117–18 (1989) (describing the factors that influence 
compensation packages). 
 50. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1538–39 (claiming that when “one form of compensation is 
restricted . . . [i]nvestors have to increase another component of the manager’s 
pay package to make up the loss in utility from the removal of the now-restricted 
compensation option”). 
 51. See id. at 1539 (stating that extension of credit to corporate officers was 
not a contentious topic). 
 52. See id. at 1539 (“There is an increase in executives’ equity ownership 
after the extension of credit to purchase stock or to exercise stock options, 
although the increase is small relative to loan value.” (referring to the study found 
in Kuldeep Shastri & Kathleen M. Kahle, Executive Loans, 39 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 791 (2004))). 
 53. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer Certification and the 
Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 20–42 (2002) (discussing pre-SOX law on executive 
certification of financial statements). 
 54. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1541–42 (stating that the results of two relevant studies are inconsistent); see also 
Beverly Hirtle, Stock Market Reaction to Financial Statement Certification by 
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the four major changes to corporate governance, this is the best 
that can be said—the empirical data is inconclusive. In other 
words, there is no firm data that the applied remedy had any 
positive impact. For the remaining three changes, the empirical 
results show—and in some cases showed at the time Sarbanes–
Oxley was being debated—that there was never any real chance of 
the remedy actually fixing anything.55 In at least one case, a 
remedy was available that could potentially have improved the 
situation, but that was ignored.56  
2. The Salesmen 
Why did this happen? Romano documents the names and 
something of the motivations of individuals she refers to as “policy 
entrepreneurs,”57 those who pushed for these proposals.58 Another 
name for these individuals would be “quacks,” regulatory snake-oil 
salesmen peddling remedies with no hope of success to a Congress 
desperate for a solution—any solution—that would cure their 
electoral ills.59 
In some cases, they had been peddling their remedies for some 
time. For example, there had been proposals to require 
independent audit committees and prohibit purchase of non-audit 
services from auditors before the Enron and Worldcom debacles.60 
                                                                                                     
Bank Holding Company CEOs, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1263, 1273 (2006) 
(finding a positive correlation between certification and firm performance); Utpal 
Bhattacharya, Peter Groznik & Bruce Haslem, Is CEO Certification of Earnings 
Numbers Value-Relevant?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 611, 611 (2007) (finding no effect 
from certification). 
 55. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1585 (arguing that it was more symbolic than effective). 
 56. See id. at 1532 (requiring a financial expert on the audit committee is 
proven to be successful, but was not mandated).  
 57. Id. at 1568. 
 58. See id. at 1568–85 (describing the background motivation for the 
proposals). 
 59. This is particularly the case for Republican members of Congress, for 
whom this type of national corporate regulation is typically disfavored, but who 
needed a way to defuse an electoral time bomb. See id. at 1564–68 (explaining 
why Republicans voted for the bill). 
 60. See id. at 1523–24 (“In particular, the independent-director requirement 
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These proposals had not been adopted, perhaps because the 
conditions were not right for such a substantial shift in power to 
regulate corporations.61 Only the advent of the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals made the public so insistent on finding a “cure” 
that Members of Congress became desperate enough to buy the 
snake oil without making some basic inquiries.62 For example, the 
existing empirical research was never discussed.63 The complete 
absence of any state regulations along the proposed lines—even 
though competition between states should have incentivized 
                                                                                                     
and the prohibition of accounting firms’ provision of consulting services to 
auditing clients had been advanced as needed corporate law reforms long before 
Enron appeared on any politician’s agenda.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A 
Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 370, 377–81 (2002) (comparing Sarbanes–Oxley rules to ALI corporate 
governance projects from the 1980s); Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting, & Mgmt. 
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., Improving the 
Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations and Their Auditors (Comm. Print 
1977) (considering a proposal to separate auditing from non-auditing services; 
Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02, 240.14a-101 (2004)); Audit 
Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42,266, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 
(Dec. 30, 1999) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228–29, 240 
(2004)). 
 61. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1524 (“[S]uccessful law reform in the national arena typically involves the 
recombination of old elements that have been advanced in policy circles for a 
number of years prior to adoption.”). Some political scientists have identified 
three factors that typically accompany major shifts: shifts in national mood; 
turnover of elected officials; and events that focus public attention. See JOHN W. 
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 20–21, 170–72, 206–08 
(1984) (noting that these three factors open the way for policy entrepreneurs to 
enact policies that would be improbable, at best, any other time); cf. Todd Zywicki 
& Jeremy Kidd, Meaningful Tort Reform: A Public Choice Analysis 44–45 (Feb. 
11, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (describing different factors and 
circumstances increasing the potential for lasting reform). 
 62. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1525 (“[I]t was widely perceived . . . that members of Congress were motivated by 
reelection concerns when a statute was hurriedly enacted in the summer prior to 
the midterm elections, after months of languishing in committee, following 
heightened attention on corporate malfeasance as the WorldCom scandal erupted 
post-Enron.”). 
 63. See id. at 1563 (noting that “empirical research was accorded little 
weight in the setting of regulation”). 
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movement towards more efficient corporate governance rules64—
was never mentioned. 
B. Dodd–Frank Also Quacks 
According to Bainbridge, the quackery in Sarbanes–Oxley is 
the rule in corporate governance regulation, rather than the 
exception.65 “In a pattern that can be traced back at least to 
England in the late 1600s, major new corporate regulation has 
tended to follow market turmoil.”66 Bainbridge labels these laws 
“bubble laws” because it is only in the crisis atmosphere that 
follows a bubble bursting that quacks find Congress desperate 
enough to buy snake oil remedies for real or imagined problems.67 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254–58 (1977) (describing a “race 
to the top” in corporate governance rules as a result of competition between 
states); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on 
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528–29 (1989) (“States that offer such 
impediments to takeovers may thus attract some chartering business. Of 
course, . . . the purpose of impediments to takeovers is precisely to reduce the 
discipline of the capital market and that may well seem attractive to inefficient 
managers.”). But see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (describing a “race to the bottom”). 
 65. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1782 (“SOX was not a one-off event. To 
the contrary, it was a fairly standard example of the boom-bust-regulate pattern 
that characterizes U.S. federal regulation of corporate governance.”). 
 66. Id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 45, at 83 (arguing that regulation in the 
wake of the 1929 crash and the South Sea Bubble of the early 1700s followed the 
same pattern). 
 67. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1786 (“It is in the post-bubble 
environment, ‘when scandals and economic reversals occur’ and ‘when corporate 
transactions grab the attention of the American public and the U.S. Congress,’ 
that Congress often acts.”). Bainbridge borrows the term “bubble laws” from 
Ribstein who diagnoses the general political, economic, and cultural trends that 
accompany the boom and bust cycle and lead to over-regulation and a willful 
blindness to the relative costs and benefits of that regulation. Ribstein, supra note 
45, at 79–83. Ribstein argues that regulation in the wake of a market crisis—a 
bust—is not cost effective for four reasons: first, the bust removes the blinders 
from investors’ eyes, making future fraud less likely; second, to the extent 
investors will be fooled in future booms, regulation will not be able to pierce the 
haze of overly optimistic expectations; third, fraud in future booms will be 
different so regulations based on past frauds are useless; and fourth, those 
formulating regulations in the wake of a bust will ignore the costs of compliance, 
so regulations are likely to be grossly inefficient. See id. at 81–82 (explaining why 
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These laws—ostensibly presented as “reforms”—share common 
characteristics: they are passed in a hurry, largely from 
ready-made policy packages that were pushed long before the 
crisis, and they penalize or prohibit useful practices, or they 
discourage risk-taking by punishing negative results.68 Stated 
more formally, Bainbridge states that quack corporate governance 
regulation shares eight characteristics: (1) it is passed in the wake 
of a negative economic event; (2) it is enacted in a crisis 
environment; (3) it is a response to a backlash against corporations 
and markets; (4) it is federal, rather than state regulation; (5) it 
transfers power from the states to the federal government; (6) it is 
supported by interest groups that have more influence at the 
national level; (7) it is a long-standing project of a powerful interest 
group; and (8) the empirical evidence is, at best, uncertain and, at 
worst, indicative of a likelihood of harm.69  
The first three characteristics define the circumstances in 
which a victim of quackery is likely to abandon reason and buy the 
sham remedy. The American public, represented by its 
government, sees itself in dire need and has identified—rightly or 
wrongly—corporations and markets as the source of its affliction. 
The last two characteristics define the remedy, which comes ready 
for sale. This is no thoughtful diagnosis and carefully designed 
remedy; the remedy was mixed long ago and any crisis would have 
sufficed to motivate the interest groups’ sales pitch.70 The lack of 
credible evidence that the remedy will cure the supposed ailments 
is the defining characteristic of quackery.71 The fourth, fifth, and 
                                                                                                     
regulation in the aftermath of a financial crisis is not cost effective).  
 68. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1786–87 (explaining the characteristics 
of bubble laws). 
 69. See id. at 1796 (listing commonalities among quack corporate governance 
regulation). 
 70. See id. at 1786 (“[T]ime tends to give advantages to interest groups and 
other policy entrepreneurs who have prepackaged purported solutions that can 
be readily adapted into legislative form. Hence, for example, many of SOX’s 
provisions were ‘recycled ideas’ that had been ‘advocated for quite some time by 
corporate governance entrepreneurs.’”). 
 71. It is conceivable that some may prefer punishment of corporations as an 
end to itself, and it is possible to fear risk-taking to such an extent that 
punishment and elimination of all risk could be seen as “successes.” Bainbridge 
and Romano assume a world where punishment for its own sake and elimination 
382 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367 (2018) 
 
sixth characteristics have more to do with a preference for federal 
regulation over state regulation, rather than the nature of the 
regulation as quackery.72 
Does Dodd–Frank qualify as quackery? Like Sarbanes–Oxley, 
Dodd–Frank was a huge, complex piece of legislation and most of 
its 2,319 pages were not focused on corporate governance.73 
Bainbridge, however, identifies six provisions of Dodd–Frank that 
fit his definition of quackery: (1) the say-on-pay mandate; (2) the 
requirement that compensation committees be independent; 
(3) additional disclosure requirements for executive compensation; 
(4) expanded clawbacks of executive compensation; (5) express 
authority for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
shareholder access rule; and (6) disclosure requirements for 
whether a single person serves as Chairman and CEO.74 Some 
provisions are a benign form of quackery, presenting nothing more 
than “meaningless symbolism,” but others are more poisonous 
tonics, imposing significant risks.75 All are quackery, however, 
because they offer no realistic chance of limiting systemic risk or 
future financial crises. 
                                                                                                     
of all risk are acceptable or desirable goals, so it is possible to imagine a world 
where these regulations do have a significant chance of success under those 
limited criteria. However, most policy debates do not expressly list punishment of 
all corporations and elimination of all risk as the goals; instead, it is typically 
argued that the goals are merely to punish wrongdoing and avoid “systemic” risk. 
See, e.g., Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd–Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 181, 184 (2013) (“With the recent global financial crisis 
starting in 2007, the issue of ‘systemic risk’ has been front and center in our 
political discourse.”). 
 72. There are legitimate arguments on both sides of this debate, as can be 
seen in Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1523–
24, but that debate is beyond the limited scope of this Article. 
 73. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1783 (“Although Dodd–Frank’s 2,319 
pages dwarf SOX in both size and scope, most of the Act deals with issues other 
than corporate governance.”). 
 74. See id. at 1783 (describing how Dodd–Frank is characteristic of 
quackery). 
 75. See id. at 1783, 1797–1815 (arguing that some of Dodd–Frank’s six 
provisions are meaningless symbolism but that others are likely to have serious 
adverse consequences).  
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1. Say-on-Pay 
The motivation for say-on-pay was the perception that 
corporate executives not only made too much, but that their pay 
was uncoupled from the performance of their companies.76 
Excessive and uncoupled compensation is allegedly the result of 
executives’ capturing the boards that decide their pay,77 allowing 
executives to reap the rewards of their positions regardless of how 
well they do their job. A review of the evidence shows this assertion 
to be highly questionable, as it has occurred while board 
independence has increased, CEO tenure has decreased, and 
accounting practices have become more transparent.78 Also, 
executive pay has risen dramatically, but no less dramatically than 
the wealth of shareholders, as market capitalization of 
corporations has risen equivalent to executive pay.79 
Even if there is no crisis in executive compensation, that does 
not mean that a change like say-on-pay might not have a positive 
impact. Some observers argue that the British experiment with 
say-on-pay indicates reason to hope that it will have a positive 
impact on U.S. corporate governance.80 Others, however, point out 
                                                                                                     
 76. See id. at 1808 (“As the Senate committee put it, ‘the economic crisis 
revealed instances in which corporate executives received very high compensation 
despite the very poor performance by their firms.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-176, 
at 133 (2010))). 
 77. Id. (quoting LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5–6 
(2004)). 
 78. See id. at 1809–10 (providing a glimpse of the immense literature on the 
topic); see also Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 
28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 133 (2003) (arguing that under the managerial power 
approach, increase in CEO compensation, increase in board independence, and 
declines in CEO tenure should not happen). 
 79. See Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So 
Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008) (“Historically, in the U.S. at least, the rise of 
CEO compensation coincided with an increase in market capitalization of the 
largest firms.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by 
Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & 
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) 
(prepared statement of John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law 
and Economics, Harvard Law School) (“While the two legal contexts are not 
identical, there is no evidence in the existing literature to suggest that the 
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that the internal costs of implementing say-on-pay will likely force 
most corporations into a narrow range of compensation plans and 
limit the number of corporate actors capable of influencing the 
compensation decision,81 or even passing control to outside 
advisory firms.82 Not only could that have exactly the opposite 
effect of that intended—allowing capture of the compensation 
decision—but it also eliminates the ability of boards to experiment 
in an effort to find more efficient forms of compensation.83 Even 
more troubling, it would hinder corporate boards in their central 
role, finding an efficient mix of accountability and discretion.84  
At best, then, say-on-pay purports to solve a problem that may 
not exist, has a shaky empirical foundation, and risks doing serious 
damage to our corporate system. The one thing it has going for it 
is that powerful interest groups have long desired it,85 and the 
economic crisis provided an atmosphere in which Congress was 
willing to buy what they were selling. 
                                                                                                     
differences would turn what would be a good idea in the U.K. into a bad one in 
the U.S.”). 
 81. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. 
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323, 325–35 
(2009) (“[W]e should avoid another rush to widespread adoption of a particular 
normative conception of executive compensation.”). 
 82. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1810–11 (“[B]ecause many institutional 
investors rely on proxy advisory firms, a very small number of gatekeepers will 
wield undue influence over compensation. This likely outcome seriously 
undercuts the case for say-on-pay.”). 
 83. Admittedly, in a market where all firms were similarly handicapped, it 
could be the case that no firm would be disproportionately disadvantaged in the 
market for corporate executives or many of the other markets in which 
corporations compete, see Butler, supra note 49, at 110–20, but that would also 
dramatically increase the importance of the concerns raised by Berle and Means 
since corporate boards would have less discretion in finding ways to control 
self-dealing by executives. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 84. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1815 (“Establishing the proper mix of 
discretion and accountability thus emerges as the central corporate governance 
question. Unfortunately, it is also a question no one in Congress appears to have 
pondered in connection with say-on-pay; instead, only accountability concerns 
seem to have mattered.”). 
 85. See id. (“Dodd–Frank’s executive compensation provisions are yet 
another example of quack corporate governance. They were strongly supported 
by institutional investors. In particular, say-on-pay is a long-standing 
institutional investor agenda item.”). 
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2. Independent Compensation Committees 
Dodd–Frank directs self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to 
adopt standards that require each member of a corporation’s 
compensation committee to be independent,86 even though the 
empirical evidence is weighted against the conclusion that 
independence of compensation committees correlates with 
improved compensation practices or firm performance.87 Recall 
that, as reviewed by Romano, the weight of the evidence was also 
against the Sarbanes–Oxley requirement that audit committees be 
independent.88 “Independence,” it would seem, is a common 
ingredient in quack corporate governance, appealing to 
policymakers who favor the remedy, but without empirical 
support. 
3. Expanded Clawback Provisions 
Dodd–Frank also requires SROs to require disclosure of 
claw-back policies, the means by which corporations recover any 
incentive-based compensation to executives if there is a violation 
of reporting requirements.89 Any corporation that does not do so 
must be delisted.90 In addition, Dodd–Frank requires that the 
policy specifically provide for recovering the difference between 
what the executive received and what would have been received if 
the financial reports had been correct.91 As adopted, the provisions 
are both over- and under-inclusive, potentially punishing many 
executives that have no role in financial reporting while failing to 
guarantee liability for those who actually perpetrate falsehoods.92 
                                                                                                     
 86. Dodd–Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 87. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1805 (referring to characteristics of 
quack corporate governance); see also Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without 
Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1582–83 (2005) 
(collecting and reviewing studies). 
 88. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the independent audit committee 
requirement).  
 89. Dodd–Frank § 954. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1806 (“[A]s a deterrent to financial 
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The provisions are therefore highly unlikely to be successful in 
curbing bad executive behavior, but the provisions will also serve 
to limit performance-based compensation, opening the door to 
greater misalignment between the interests of management and of 
shareholders.93 
4. Shareholder Access Rule 
Released as proposed Rule 14a-11 on August 25, 2010, Dodd–
Frank provided express authority for the SEC to proceed with its 
proxy access rules.94 The rule requires corporations to include on 
corporate proxy materials the nominees of shareholders holding at 
least three percent of outstanding shares continuously for at least 
three years.95 The rulemaking process was obviously far advanced 
when Dodd–Frank was passed, so this provision was 
unnecessary.96 As such, this provision may have been largely 
harmless quackery, but the rule itself has the potential to cause 
increased board conflict, making it harder for corporate boards to 
function efficiently.97 Moreover, this was heavily lobbied for by a 
powerful special interest—institutional investors, who have their 
                                                                                                     
reporting fraud and error, it is overinclusive . . . . On the other hand, . . . the 
policy . . . applies only to a ‘very limited number of employees.’”). 
 93. See id. at 1807 (“In response to SOX’s much narrower clawback 
provision, ‘companies increased non-forfeitable, fixed-salary compensation and 
decreased incentive compensation, thereby providing insurance to managers for 
increased risk.’”). 
 94. See id. at 1802 (noting the status of proxy access rules under Dodd–
Frank). 
 95. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (“The new rules will require, under certain circumstances, a 
company’s proxy materials to provide shareholders with information about, and 
the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s, or a group of shareholders’, nominees for 
director.”). 
 96. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1802 (“An SEC rulemaking proceeding 
on proxy access was well advanced long before Dodd–Frank was adopted, so a 
shove from Congress was superfluous.”). 
 97. See id. at 1803 (“The likely effects of proxy access therefore will not be 
better governance. It is more likely to be an increase in interpersonal conflict (as 
opposed to the more useful cognitive conflict).”). 
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own interests that may not coincide with the interests of 
shareholders, generally.98 
5. Disclosure Requirements 
Dodd–Frank requires disclosure, in annual proxy statements, 
of the relationship between the financial performance of the firm 
and the compensation received by executives, as well as the annual 
total compensation of the CEO, the median annual total 
compensation of all the corporation’s employees (excluding the 
CEO), and a ratio of CEO compensation to the median.99 Also 
required is the public disclosure of whether a single individual 
holds the positions of CEO and chairman and the reason for 
choosing a particular structure.100 Bainbridge refers to these 
provisions as “therapeutic disclosures,” intended to push 
corporations towards a single model of compensation and board 
structure.101  
Initially, this might seem contradictory to Romano’s 
discussion of quackery, in that Romano offers disclosures as a 
preferred alternative to the type of regulations mandated by 
                                                                                                     
 98. See id. at 1804 (quoting Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Amendments Regarding 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010)). Professor Alicia 
Davis has argued that institutional investors prefer the type of strong internal 
controls mandated by Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank because they believe 
them to be value enhancing. Alicia J. Davis, The Institutional Appetite for Quack 
Corporate Governance, 2105 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 71. However, that still leaves 
open the question of what those institutional investors value, and it could be 
something other than wealth. Professor Davis finds it unlikely that all categories 
of institutional investors—pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, 
banks—“are motivated by political considerations over return maximization,” id. 
at 66, which is almost certainly true, but it also misses the point. Some of those 
institutional investors could prefer strong internal controls for political 
considerations because that is what they value, but others could still have 
preferences that diverge from those of the average shareholder who wishes to 
maximize returns and know that they will be better able to assert their influence 
after strong internal controls are put in place. 
 99. Dodd–Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 100. Id. § 972. 
 101. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1797 (“Therapeutic disclosures are not 
intended to inform investors. Instead, they are intended to affect substantive 
corporate behavior.”). 
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Sarbanes–Oxley,102 but the distinction is understandable in 
context. Romano advocates providing shareholders basic 
information regarding audit procedures, which will allow 
shareholders and financial markets to determine the efficient 
solutions.103 Conversely, the Dodd–Frank disclosures on 
compensation require collection and dissemination of information 
not collected in the normal course of business,104 and that is 
unrelated to the operation of a corporate enterprise.105 Dodd–
Frank’s board structure disclosures are also not designed to inform 
shareholders, but rather to shame corporations into separating the 
two positions.106  There is also no evidence that the disclosures will 
have a positive impact on the corporations that conform their 
structure to public shaming.107  
                                                                                                     
 102. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1527–28 (“[The provisions] could have been formulated as disclosure 
mandates. Had that been done, those provisions would have fallen within the 
conventional regulatory apparatus. Instead, they were imposed as substantive 
mandates, a different and more costly regulatory approach.”). 
 103. See id. at 1542 (relating how market pressures punished firms that 
maintained “opaque financial statements”). 
 104. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1797 (“This information would 
undoubtedly be extremely time-consuming to collect and analyze, making it 
virtually impossible for a company with thousands of employees to comply with 
this section of the Act.”). 
 105. See id. at 1798 (“The law taps into public anger at the increasing 
disparity between the faltering incomes of middle America and the largely 
recession-proof multimillion-dollar remuneration of the typical corporate chief.” 
(quoting Jean Eaglesham & Francesco Gurerrera, US Pay Law Branded 
‘Logistical Nightmare,’ FIN. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2010), 
https://www.ft.com/content/977211ac-b461-11df-8208-00144feabdc0 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review))). 
 106. See id. (referring to policy entrepreneurs who “hope that the provision 
will shame companies into separating” the CEO and chairman positions). 
 107. See id. (arguing that the claim that separating the positions will have 
positive impacts is “without compelling support in the empirical literature”); see 
also Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving 
Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47–48 (2009) 
(statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law & Economics, Harvard Law 
School) (“The only clear lesson from these studies [comparing split and unified 
Chair/CEO positions] is that there has been no long-term trend or convergence on 
a split chair/CEO structure.”). Bainbridge points out that a unified structure can 
limit board oversight of a CEO’s performance, but only because independent 
board members have ceded too much power to the chairman; reclaiming that 
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In addition to the specific characteristics of Dodd–Frank’s 
disclosure rules that show them to be quackery—enacted by 
desperate politicians at the behest of special interests with no 
evidence of likely efficacy—any form of therapeutic disclosure 
should be looked at skeptically.108 Traditional disclosure is useful 
because it allows markets to operate more effectively.109 It does 
this by giving market actors the information that helps set the 
price of corporate securities.110 Therapeutic disclosure mandates 
require collection and disclosure of information that is not 
intended to inform market actors but, instead, coerce corporations 
into making specific changes that were not chosen in a 
well-functioning market.111 Because these changes could not be 
achieved in the market, their success through regulation will be 
the result of pressure brought by institutional investors who want 
them for purposes other than the welfare of the corporation.112 
These special interests can get what they want only if Congress 
buys their quackery. 
6. The Salesmen 
Dodd–Frank’s solutions to perceived corporate governance 
problems seem quite poorly designed, even if the perceived 
problems are real.113 The empirical evidence does not support any 
                                                                                                     
power solves the problem without effectively mandating a split structure. See 
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1800 (advocating the adoption of such steps as 
by-laws allowing board members to call special meetings and require periodic 
meetings outside the presence of managers). 
 108. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1797 (arguing that therapeutic 
disclosures are not intended to inform investors, but to affect corporate behavior). 
 109. See Butler, supra note 49, at 106 (explaining how information reaching 
investors through voluntary and mandatory disclosures, news stories, and 
analyst reports affects market efficiencies). 
 110. See id. (describing the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis). 
 111. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1797–1801 (discussing how the Pay 
Disclosures and Board Structure Disclosure of Dodd–Frank were intended to 
affect substantive corporate behavior). 
 112. See id. at 1801 (citing the role of institutional investors, who possess 
more clout at the federal level than state level, as satisfying one of the criteria for 
quack corporate governance). 
 113. As with Romano, Bainbridge argues that, whatever flaws might exist in 
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of the proposals but Congress bought the sales pitch that these 
were wonderful remedies.114 Who was selling these particular 
formulas of snake oil? Bainbridge identifies institutional investors 
as the relevant policy entrepreneurs, especially unions and state 
and local pension funds.115 Particularly with say-on-pay and proxy 
access, but also with other provisions, institutional investors had 
long desired this outcome,116 and they will certainly be the most 
likely to use these new powers to generate additional returns for 
themselves, possibly at the expense of the corporation and other 
shareholders.117 In other words, a remedy was purchased for a 
                                                                                                     
state corporate governance laws, those laws did not contribute to the collapse that 
led to Dodd–Frank. Id. at 1815; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate 
Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 
500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2009) (“A striking aspect of the stock market meltdown of 
2008 is that it occurred despite the strengthening of U.S. corporate governance 
over the past few decades and a reorientation toward the promotion of 
shareholder value.”). 
 114. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing that empirical 
evidence weighs against independence of compensation committees improving 
compensation practices or firm performance); supra notes 76–79 and 
accompanying text (highlighting empirical evidence against the efficacy of 
say-on-pay provisions). 
 115. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1816 (identifying these groups as “able 
to hijack the legislative process to advance a long-standing political agenda”). 
 116. Id. The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) provided the Senate 
Committee with written testimony in support of the say-on-pay provision. S. REP. 
NO. 111-176, at 134 (2010). Additionally, The Chief Investment Officer of the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Joseph Dear, wrote in 
testimony for the Senate Banking Committee that “[b]oards of directors should 
be encouraged to separate the role of chair and CEO, or explain why they have 
adopted another method to assure independent leadership of the board.” Id. at 
147. CII also wrote to Senator Dodd to support reforms requiring credit rating 
agencies to use methodologies approved by boards of directors and disclose 
qualitative and quantitative information to enable investors to better understand 
credit ratings. Id. at 119–20. 
 117. As one example, the union representing Safeway employees was a 
Safeway shareholder and used proxy access in an attempt to oust board members 
who had stood up to union leadership during collective bargaining negotiations. 
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1817. SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey apparently 
agrees with that assessment, pointing out in her dissent from the new rule, that: 
The paradigm of a power struggle between directors and shareholders 
is one that activist, largely institutional, investors assiduously 
promote . . . . Yet, these shareholders do not necessarily represent the 
interests of all shareholders, and the Commission betrays its mission 
when it treats these investors as a proxy for all shareholders. 
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malady that might not exist, the remedy would not likely work, 
anyway, and only the purveyor of the quack remedy is enriched. 
C. The Quackery Hypothesis 
As formulated by Romano and refined by Bainbridge, 
quackery in corporate governance regulation usually arises in the 
wake of a significant negative market event, as that event 
generates both hostility towards corporations in public sentiment 
and public pressure on Congress to do something.118 The regulation 
comes in a form that was crafted before the crisis in a way that it 
can be “readily adapted into legislative form” by an interest group 
that has its own reasons for desiring the regulation.119 This implies 
that the solutions are, to some extent, in search of a problem that 
will serve as a suitable vehicle for the reforms, rather than 
solutions designed to fix an identified problem. Furthermore, the 
remedy has no strong empirical support—either the empirical 
evidence argues strongly against enactment of the policy or, at 
best, the evidence is mixed.120 
                                                                                                     
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open 
Meeting to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010), (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm).  
 118. Bainbridge elaborates on the role of bubbles in generating the lax 
enforcement during the boom—which increases risk dramatically—and 
exacerbating the overreaction when the bubble bursts. See generally Bainbridge, 
supra note 5, at 1785–86. The rising values of nearly all portfolios can lull 
regulators into a false sense of security and lower the level of oversight given by 
regulators. Id. Reacting to the lower level of scrutiny, many financial entities will 
increase their risk levels beyond what would otherwise be appropriate, and many 
will engage in outright fraud. Id. When the bubble inevitably bursts, that 
increased risky behavior and fraud provides ample justification for Romano’s 
policy entrepreneurs (Bainbridge’s “anticorporate populists”), id. at 1784, to push 
for additional regulation. Id. at 1786; see also Romano, Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1591–94 (tracing this recurring 
phenomenon back before the New Deal to the Future Trading Act of 1921); 
Ribstein, supra note 45, at 79 (referring to this cycle as the “boom-bubble-bust-
regulate cycle of financial market regulation”). 
 119. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1786. 
 120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the empirical 
evidence results for various provisions of Dodd–Frank). 
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The historical snake-oil salesman operated in very similar 
fashion, packaging a “remedy” that had no foundation in medical 
science, then selling it as a cure for anything that might ail the 
potential customer.121 Some victims might be especially gullible, 
but the primary success of the early American quack would have 
arisen out of moments of crisis, when the “patient” was desperate 
for a cure.122 Modern day medical quacks might be more 
technologically advanced,123 but the conditions for a successful 
quackery scam are the same: crisis in the life of the “patient,” a 
prepackaged remedy—who has time to wait for a tailored remedy 
when there is money to be made—and money in the pocket of the 
quack.124 Unfortunately, the scenario also plays out in our 
regulatory system. 
One way to appreciate the suitability of the quackery analysis 
is to view it in light of the evolution of medical regulation, except 
in reverse. One commentator describes the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as detrimental to public health—and 
particularly vulnerable populations—because anyone could 
market a medical remedy and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) had to show that the remedy was not safe before it could be 
removed.125 The difficult task of proving a negative meant that the 
time between introduction of a new medical remedy and any 
adverse action by the FDA would be substantial and the cost “in 
terms of human suffering” during that time span could be high.126 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 219 (using Swaim’s Panacea, a quack 
remedy claimed to cure cancer, scrofula, rheumatism, gout, hepatitis, and syphilis 
as an example). 
 122. See id. at 216–17 (“[T]he degree of gullibility was proportional to the level 
of desperation of the individual for a cure.”).  
 123. See id. at 213–15 (discussing the weight-loss supplement industry). The 
California Bureau of Food and Drug Inspections has confiscated any number of 
more modern devices that had been represented as having a valid remedial or 
diagnostic use: a converted juke box; a common steel ball; an overhauled five-tube 
radio: a floodlight behind a piece of red glass; and the Calozone Ozone Generator, 
a device that generated high levels of potentially deadly ozone. Quackery in 
California, supra note 26, at 265–66. 
 124. Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 219. 
 125. See id. at 216 (lamenting that during this lag time “predatory commercial 
interests” could profit from the scientific uncertainty). 
 126. Id. at 217. 
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Moreover, the only limit on the success of quacks was “the 
gullibility of their targets,” which was usually “proportional to the 
level of desperation of the individual for a cure.”127 
Eventually, the burden shifted, and now the producer of a 
medical device or other remedy must prove its safety and 
effectiveness before it will be allowed to market that product.128 
This historical shift is seen as a positive development129 yet, if the 
quackery hypothesis is correct, the trend in regulation is in the 
opposite direction. Today, regulatory “solutions” can be enacted 
without any evidence of their safety or effectiveness and anyone 
who insists on empirical support bears the burden of proving that 
the regulations are harmful.130 That burden is difficult and the 
time spent amassing the empirical evidence represents irreparable 
harm to capital markets, the economy as a whole, and individual 
market participants who bear the costs of regulatory quackery. 
In this way, regulatory quackery is worse than medical 
quackery; a victim of medical quackery must be convinced to pay 
the costs and those costs fall almost exclusively on the victim.131 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 216–17. 
 128. See id. at 217 (noting that it took a series of “highly publicized health 
crises to create the political will” to require manufacturers to obtain preapproval 
for new drugs). 
 129. There are some who argue that our current regulatory scheme for 
medical technology leads to greater death and morbidity by increasing the cost of 
drug development and delaying the availability of life-saving drugs. See Ariel 
Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 
14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2007) (describing the most common 
objections to the current regulatory regime). 
 130. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1796 (pointing out the way SEC 
regulators dismissed empirical evidence that did not support the regulation while 
treating supportive studies as “if these studies were on point and above critique 
when in fact they are not” (quoting Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt the Final Rule Regarding 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25, 2010) 
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap. 
htm))). 
 131. There is a possibility for some spillover costs associated with an 
individual failing to receive real medical care in a timely fashion because a quack 
remedy has distracted the individual. For example, a condition might 
unnecessarily worsen, requiring a greater amount of medical care than if caught 
earlier. That increase in the demand for health care services will raise prices and 
force others obtaining care at the same time to pay more, either in money or time 
costs. See David E. Newman-Toker et al., How Much Diagnostic Safety Can We 
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With regulatory quackery, however, hundreds of millions can be 
victimized after convincing only a few hundred individuals—a 
majority of both houses of Congress and the President.132 The cost 
of regulatory quackery, therefore, is certain to be orders of 
magnitude greater than the cost of medical quackery. Moreover, 
while any decision to purchase a quack remedy—medical or 
regulatory—becomes more likely the greater the crisis,133 a victim 
of medical quackery is buying in order to maximize individual net 
benefits, but the purchaser of regulatory quackery is buying 
something else entirely—likely another term in office. Eliminating 
medical quackery, therefore, is a question of providing the correct 
information so that individuals will realize that the benefit is 
zero.134 Regulatory quackery, on the other hand, cannot be so easily 
corrected. Although political actors may know that the remedy is 
useless or harmful, they might buy the remedy anyway, because 
those costs can be hidden in the overall complexity of government 
regulation.135 
Of course, the quackery hypothesis is not without its critics. 
One obvious avenue of disagreement is that Romano and 
Bainbridge are simply wrong about the ability of Sarbanes–Oxley 
and Dodd–Frank to achieve any positive ends.136 This critique may 
                                                                                                     
Afford, and How Should We Decide, 22 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY (SUPPLEMENTAL 
ISSUE 2) 11, 11 (2013) (suggesting indirect costs arise from medical misdiagnosis 
in the form of defensive medicine, increased liability premiums, and other 
“downstream effects” to over $45 billion). 
 132. If quack regulations were arguably within existing statutory authority, 
the number of people who would need to be convinced to buy the sham remedy 
could be dramatically lower. Because the purchase decision would reside within 
the regulatory agency, it could, theoretically, be made by a handful of individuals. 
 133. See Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 216–17 (“The more dire the condition, 
the more vulnerable an individual was to the ‘flim flam’ of the greedy snake oil 
salesman.”).  
 134. See id. at 220–21 (explaining the early efforts of the FDA to weed out 
quack medicine). 
 135. Political actors may use a time of crisis to increase (comparing the 
Dodd-Frank response to Robert Higgs “ratchet” theory where the government 
wades into a sphere during a crisis, becomes entrenched, and then does not 
retreat because interest groups have an incentive to preserve the status quo). 
 136. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes–Oxley as 
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1843, 1845 (2007) (arguing that Romano and Bainbridge, among others, err in 
concluding that “statutory enactments that do not accord with the majority view 
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be correct, but it is beside the point of the broader quackery 
critique, given that some of those same critics concede the 
procedural point, that Congress does not give careful consideration 
to the empirical support for policy proposals.137 Whether or not 
there is large-scale damage to the economy from regulatory 
                                                                                                     
of an array of disparate studies reaching a broad range of conclusions are 
automatically major gaffes” and that later analyses of the data “actually supports 
several of the provisions that Romano and others critique”). Prentice and Spence 
also argue that times of crisis are necessary to overcome the stranglehold that 
business interests have over the regulatory process. Id. at 1845–46. However, 
their argument fails because they rely too heavily on a misreading of the 
regulatory capture literature. It is true that business interests will often have 
incentives to combine to manipulate the regulatory process, id. at 1847, but they 
are hardly the only group that possesses those incentives. Mancur Olson, who 
Prentice and Spence cite approvingly, is very clear that it is smaller groups with 
closely aligned interests that have these incentives. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 22–43 (1975). 
However, they are simply wrong to assert that Olson believes that “businesses” 
are more likely to engage in this behavior. Prentice & Spence, supra, at 1847. 
Instead, Olson makes a distinction between “inclusive” and “exclusive” groups, 
and argues that exclusive groups—market groups—are more likely to attempt 
capture to erect barriers to entry. OLSON, supra, at 37. While an easy mistake to 
make, it is incorrect to assume that “market” equals “business” in a strict sense, 
for Olson’s definition of exclusive groups indicates that many non-business groups 
would be included. See id. at 37 n.56 (using social clubs as an example). The 
defining characteristic is whether the group wishes for fewer, rather than more, 
participants. Id. at 37. Unions, institutional investors, and all of the policy 
entrepreneurs identified by Romano and Bainbridge clearly fall within the 
“exclusive” category. 
 137. See, e.g., Prentice & Spence, supra note 136, at 1845 (“[W]e concede that 
Congress did not examine the empirical academic literature as thoroughly as it 
might have (or perhaps at all).”). Other criticisms are even more beside the point, 
such as the one that posits essentially a temper tantrum by Romano and 
Bainbridge because their preferred model of corporate law—the contractarian 
model—was superseded by absolutes in federal law. See generally J. Robert 
Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes–Oxley and Quack Corporate 
Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309, 310, 316–18 (2006). Brown describes the 
“likely” positive—though “modest”—changes that he believes will result from 
Sarbanes–Oxley, id. at 319, but his belief could also be no different from the 
average purchaser of snake oil. More fundamental is his rejection of the 
contractarian model of corporate law, largely because he believes the decline in 
takeovers destroys the practical viability of the check on self-dealing by corporate 
managers. Id. at 312–13. This caricature of the model is largely a straw man, 
because contractarians believe corporations compete in a wide range of markets, 
not just the market for corporate control. See Butler, supra note 49, at 110–17 
(discussing the involvement of corporations in the stock market, product market, 
and capital markets, among others). 
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quackery is a guessing game under those circumstances. The 
Congress that buys such a remedy may hope for the best, but so do 
all who purchase quack medical remedies.138 Moreover, it is even 
possible for quack remedies to have random positive effects, 
possibly as placebo effects.139 
Our nation’s history regarding medical quackery is in stark 
contrast with the ongoing trends in regulatory quackery. Instead 
of beginning with the presumption that regulatory solutions are 
safe and effective—something we have abandoned in the medical 
field140—we should demand evidence that those solutions are likely 
to work. Such a demand is not likely to be popular during a crisis 
but, as our history with medical quackery should teach us, crises 
are when evidence and caution are most important.141 
Yet, as important as the quackery hypothesis is to 
understanding that there is something wrong with the way we 
approach regulation in our modern world, it is still missing 
something. Although Bainbridge more clearly illuminates the role 
of interest groups in adopting quackery,142 he also stops short of 
expressly asking whether their interest is merely a mistaken 
understanding of how markets work—so that the costs imposed 
are the result of negligence—or whether they are designed to 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Sheldon Richman, Dodd–Frank Only Makes Things Worse, AM. INST. 
FOR ECON. RES. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.aier.org/research/dodd-frank-only-
makes-things-worse (last visited Nov. 20, 2017) (explaining Dodd–Frank as the 
result of common government intervention: “pile new regulations atop old, and 
hope for the best”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Quackery 
in California, supra note 26, at 267 (describing the victims of quackery as “the 
hopeless” and the “miracle seekers”). 
 139. For a medical description of placebos, see Thomas, supra note 27, at 313–
15 (relating anecdotes of terminal patients whose lifespans were incredibly 
extended because they believed in the curative effects of placebos). 
 140. See Van Tassel, supra note 27, at 216 (discussing how the FDA’s 
premarket enforcement process places the cost and burden on product 
manufacturers to show that their products are safe and effective). 
 141. See id. at 217 (suggesting that where conditions were most dire, the more 
vulnerable people were to deception and the greater the resulting harm when the 
sham medicine did not work). 
 142. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1816 (“Dodd–Frank’s corporate 
governance provisions were included in the legislation because key policy 
entrepreneurs were able to hijack the legislative process to advance a 
long-standing political agenda.”). 
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achieve specific goals other than those expressed by 
policymakers.143 For example, he identifies that proxy access has 
been the “pet project” of large, institutional investors for some 
time,144 but does not elaborate as to the specific benefits that they 
hope to gain with the change.145 Even when discussing say-on-pay, 
which he identifies as being supported by unions and consumer 
protection groups and opposed by business groups,146 he does not 
identify the competing interests that draw such attention. 
To be clear, both Romano and Bainbridge appear to 
understand and appreciate that special interests seek individual 
benefits from general policy prescriptions.147 Yet, their analysis of 
quackery is lacking the formal distinction between quackery 
motivated by negligence and that explicitly motivated by parochial 
interests. More importantly, their analysis largely avoids 
consideration of the potential for non-shareholder third-parties to 
intervene—perhaps surreptitiously—in the legislative process in 
order to achieve goals that have nothing to do with the relationship 
between shareholders and management. The next section provides 
the theoretical tool necessary to fill that gap. In colorful fashion, it 
adds bootleggers to our discussion of quackery. 
III. Bootleggers and Baptists 
                                                                                                     
 143. See generally id. (stopping short of asking whether this is a result of 
negligence). 
 144. Id. at 1804.  
 145. See generally id. (avoiding discussion of any specific benefits). 
 146. See id. at 1808 (stating no more than that the issue “was highly 
contentious” and listing the groups on either side of the issue). 
 147. See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a 
Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231–32 
(2001) 
It is quite probable that private benefits accrue to some investors from 
sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. . . . Examples of 
potential benefits . . . are progress on labor rights desired by union 
fund managers and enhanced political reputations for public pension 
fund managers, as well as advancements in personal employment. 
See also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1816 (“It seems reasonable to assume that 
these same activist investors will be the shareholders most likely to make use of 
their new powers.”). 
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Regulation—financial or otherwise—is often thought of as a 
way of correcting market failures,148 and laws and regulations like 
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank are often promoted based on 
that justification,149 yet it can also be an opportunity to pursue 
private gain outside of a market context. It might seem obvious 
that those who bear the costs of regulation would lobby for its 
repeal; instead, they often argue in favor of regulation.150 This 
                                                                                                     
 148. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global 
Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 177, 185–86 (2002) (describing the public 
interest theory of regulation); Brown, supra note 137, at 311–18 (arguing that the 
market for corporate control has ceased to function, removing essential market 
mechanisms for policing director behavior). The term “market failure” has a 
reasonably precise definition: some circumstance that interferes with market 
mechanisms and precludes prices from adjusting to achieve efficient outcomes. 
See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 125–26 (3d ed. 2014) (recognizing that market 
failures often become justifications for governmental intrusion). The term is used 
colloquially in far less precise fashion, often referring to any market outcome that 
does not match the speaker’s normative view of what the world should look like. 
As it turns out, those suboptimal outcomes can be the result of prior government 
action, making further government intervention unwise. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28 (1960)  
The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as 
requiring corrective Government action is, in fact, often the result of 
Government action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is 
a real danger that extensive Government intervention in the economic 
system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful 
effects being carried too far. 
See also Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 149 (2014) 
(making Coase’s theories more accessible and understandable); Jeremy Kidd & 
Joseph R. Padgett, Trucker Shortage as Government Failure, 1 LOY. U. CHI. J. 
REG. COMPLIANCE 7 (2016) (arguing that the U.S. trucker shortage is the result of 
unhelpful Department of Transportation safety regulations).  
 149. See BUTLER ET AL., supra note 148, at 125–26 (discussing market failure 
as a normative ground for government intervention). Other theories of regulation 
criticize this approach. In the capture theory, regulatory bodies become captive to 
the regulated industries, which use regulation to cartelize the industry and 
reduce competition. Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 186. In the economic 
theory of regulation, formulated by George Stigler, regulation is merely another 
tool by which producers maximize profits. See id. (“[A]s a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated for its benefit.” (quoting 
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
3, 3 (1971))). 
 150. See Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13 (positing that 
industry representatives may be okay with regulations, so long as they can still 
minimize their own costs). 
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phenomenon is not new, with London weavers’ demanding and 
receiving specific regulatory mention in the Magna Carta in the 
thirteenth century.151 In modern times, examples include biotech 
companies lobbying for government standards on their 
gene-spliced crops,152 cigarette companies lobbying for regulation 
of their own e-cigarette lines,153 and industry lobbying for 
environmental regulations.154 The most extreme example of this 
would be sellers of illegal products lobbying to maintain their 
illegal status, such as bootleggers during Prohibition.155  
The rationale for this behavior is simple: regulations inhibit 
competition, particularly from new market entrants that are 
deterred by the burden of the new regulations.156 Even more 
attractive is regulation that inhibits competition in a way that 
imposes costs on everyone else, particularly competitors but also 
potentially consumers.157 For example, if you own large swaths of 
private forest just perfect for logging, you might lobby for 
restrictions on logging in public forests in order to increase the 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. at 12 (“[T]he Magna Carta require[ed] all cloth woven in the realm 
to be of uniform dimensions—conforming to the London standard.”).  
 152. Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, Bootleggers and Biotechs, REGULATION, 
Summer 2003, at 12. 
 153. See Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic 
Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 348 (2016) (hinting that encouraging 
regulations is a way of preventing new brands or products from entering the 
market). 
 154. See Todd Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political 
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 
73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856–74 (1999) (explaining that regulation can benefit 
industry by increasing demand or restricting entry of competitors); see also A.H. 
Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions 
of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 25 (2001) (quoting 
William Y. Brown, an officer of WMX, the nation’s largest waste management 
company, as supporting stricter environmental regulation because “[s]tricter 
legislation is environmentally good and it also helps our business”). 
 155. See Brenner M. Fissell, Abstract Risk and the Politics of the Criminal 
Law, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 657, 674 (2014) (“[C]ontinued prohibition was 
supported even by those who took a morally opposite stance (the bootleggers), all 
because they reaped the monetary rewards of the illegality.”). 
 156. Adler et al., supra note 153, at 348. 
 157. See Fissell, supra 155, at 674 (explaining the economic self-interest in 
industry advocating environmental regulations as “raising rivals’ relative cost”). 
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value of your land and your trees.158 The result of these efforts is 
typically higher prices and increased profits.159 
This rent-seeking160 is predicted by public choice economists, 
but it often leads to the formation of coalitions that defy 
conventional wisdom. For example, when President Barack 
Obama announced new fuel economy standards on May 16, 2009, 
those standards were cheered by automobile executives, union 
leaders, and environmental groups.161 Some observers, such as 
Obama Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, offered positive spin, that 
the diverse coalition supporting the changes was something to be 
desired,162 but diverse and unusual coalitions can also be a sign 
that there is more going on than is initially obvious.163 Diverse 
coalitions may be a sign that the inevitable unintended 
consequences164 might not have been unintended, after all. When 
things go awry and the policy’s flaws appear, they may just be 
revealing the reason the bootleggers got involved in the first place. 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REGULATION, 
Fall 1999, at 5, 6 [hereinafter Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect] (describing how 
Weyerhauser Corporation, a timber company, encouraged prohibiting logging on 
federal lands, ostensibly to protect owl habitats, which resulted in unusually high 
returns to its own privately held and adjacent timberlands). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Rent-seeking is the process by which individuals seek to obtain personal 
benefits by manipulating public decision-makers, whether regulators or 
legislators. The phrase “rent-seeking” was coined by Anne O. Kreuger in The 
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974), 
based on Gordon Tullock’s earlier work on regulatory agencies, The Welfare Costs 
of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 7 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
 161. Bruce Yandle, America’s New Fuel Economy Cartel, REGULATION, Fall 
2009, at 6–7 (2009). 
 162. See id. at 6 (“You will see people that normally are at odds with each 
other in agreement with each other.”). 
 163. See id. at 6–9 (applying the “Bootlegger and Baptist” theory to explain 
the convergence of interests behind the new fuel standards). 
 164. See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s 
Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1517 (1998) (“The law of unintended 
consequences decrees that the resolution of current problems will create or reveal 
new ones.”). 
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A. Bootlegger Theory 
Bruce Yandle first proposed the Bootleggers and Baptists 
theory more than thirty years ago.165 At its core, the theory 
explains how “durable social regulation evolves when it is 
demanded by . . . ‘Baptists’ [who] point to the moral high 
ground . . . . [And] Bootleggers, who expect to profit from the very 
regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists.”166 In other words, a 
regulatory change is most likely to succeed and endure when 
fronted by morally persuasive supporters but financed by 
behind-the-scenes moneyed interests.167 The theory’s name was 
derived from the “colorful tales of states’ efforts” to restrict alcohol 
sales on Sunday.168 Bootleggers desire one day where the 
competitive marketplace for alcohol is shut down, making 
themselves the only game in town, while the Baptists have strong 
moral preferences for a ban on alcohol sales on their Sabbath.169  
When applied broadly, the theory helps explain some of the 
peculiar regulatory outcomes that emerge from various 
government bodies, particularly those regulations that appear to 
do nothing and yet somehow persist. Although the connections are 
often not visible to the public, coalitions form between moral 
crusaders and amoral profiteers and those coalitions can explain 
the regulatory outcomes.170 Separately, money and morality are 
powerful tools; combined, they gain strength beyond what can be 
explained by mere summation of their efforts.171 However, it 
should be obvious that it is not enough just to have the money and 
morals because the form the regulation takes must also be 
                                                                                                     
 165. Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13. 
 166. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. 
 167. See Randy T. Simmons, Ryan M. Yonk, & Diana W. Thomas, Bootleggers, 
Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational Game and 
Morality Play of Regulatory Politics, 15 INDEP. REV. 367, 368 (2011) (“Bootlegger, 
then, is a term for those who benefit economically, and Baptist for those who 
provide moral cover for the regulations.”). 
 168. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. 
 169. Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13. 
 170. Id. at 13–14. 
 171. See id. at 14 (explaining how the two tools combined can be used to 
benefit politicians who enact regulations). 
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acceptable to the regulator.172 Understanding what each party to 
this dance wants most is essential to understanding how our 
seemingly haphazard regulatory process may actually be quite 
methodical. 
1. What’s in it for the Baptist?173 
The Baptist is motivated by normative views about what the 
world should look like.174 Whether the world has too much of some 
pernicious evil—alcohol, in Yandle’s original example—or too little 
of something important for human flourishing, the Baptist believes 
it is important for the government to take an active role in 
correcting the problem.175 Baptists have organizational strength, 
the ability to fill airwaves or protest spaces with moral 
arguments—verbal or written on placards—in favor of government 
action.176 These are powerful tools, and the Baptist can achieve 
some success alone.177 Achieving larger goals, however, requires 
                                                                                                     
 172. The use of the term “regulator” in this Article is not limited to individuals 
who work for those regulatory bodies that comprise the administrative state, 
although that is the most common usage. Instead, it can also include all those 
who are engaged in the lawmaking process, whether in the legislative or executive 
branch. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5–7 (explaining 
the role of political actors in both branches on the Kyoto Protocol). Although there 
are some interesting questions to be asked regarding the role of judiciary actors 
as regulators, see, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, Abstract Morality for an Abstract Order: 
Liberalism’s Difficult Problem, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 7, 26–34 (2015) (discussing 
the role of the judiciary in changing legal rules and the impact those changes have 
on markets), those questions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 173. In case it is not abundantly clear, the term “Baptist” is used in a 
metaphorical sense only. Although the anecdotes that gave rise to Yandle’s theory 
involved actual religionists who followed the Baptist creed, the term here refers 
to anyone who promotes policy based on moral grounds. 
 174. But see Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? The Political Economy of Political 
Environmental Interest Groups 2 (Geo. Mason U.L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 
02-23, 2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=334341 (proposing that even many 
purported Baptists are pursuing individual rewards, rather than the public 
interest). 
 175. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5–6. 
 176. See id. at 5 (highlighting the “vital and vocal” nature of Baptists’ 
support). 
 177. Id.  
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more than just convincing words; government action is always 
costly, including the political cost of shifting the status quo.178 
When the goals are particularly lofty, the Baptist will need 
help with those areas of the political process that do not yield to 
mere organizational strength.179 Monetary resources are necessary 
to make the most effective use of the Baptists’ strength—paid 
media to complement any free media generated by the movement, 
for example.180 Bootleggers can make donations to the cause or 
form a front organization with an innocuous name to run 
complementary advertisements.181 When regulators or legislators 
balk at the effort required to change the law and move the status 
quo, the bootleggers can donate to reelection campaigns or 
otherwise “grease the political machinery,”182 in order to remove 
more tepid opposition. In economic terms, the bootlegger lowers 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 188 (“Baptists lower the costs of 
favor-seeking for the bootleggers because politicians can pose as being motivated 
purely by the public interest even while they promote the interests of well-funded 
businesses.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 190 (referring to the environmental context to show how media 
attention focuses on the environmental activists while the industrial actors work 
behind the scenes). 
 181. This description of the bootlegger places in stark contrast the 
fundamental—some might say irreconcilable—difference between the Baptists 
and the bootleggers. It can be easy to criticize the Baptist for accepting help from 
those whose interests are at odds with the underlying moral goals, but it is 
important to recall that bootleggers can direct money towards these efforts in 
ways that mask the true source. See Adler et al., supra note 153, at 320 (“For 
things to work, the Bootleggers and Baptists need only pursue similar outcomes. 
They need not work directly together and, in many instances, have quite different 
ultimate policy goals and likely disdain each other.”). A Baptist might not know 
the morally questionable nature of the aid or, alternatively, might suspect 
something is amiss but refuse to investigate so as to avoid having to confront the 
contradiction. See Donald J. Kochan, Incumbent Landscapes, Disruptive Uses: 
Perspectives on Marijuana-Related Land Use Control, 3 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 35, 
54–55 (2016) (“The Baptists will look the other way as to the bootleggers’ motives 
and remain willfully blind to the possible immoral acts that the bootleggers might 
perpetrate, because they know that without bootlegger funding in the legislative 
effort, the effort is less likely to succeed.”). It may even be that a third-party 
“political entrepreneur” is coordinating the efforts of bootleggers and Baptists as 
a means of pursuing individual preferences. See Simmons et al., supra note 167, 
at 368 (positing that this third-party mediation is more likely than Baptists and 
bootleggers directly coordinating their efforts). 
 182. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. 
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the Baptists’ marginal cost and expands the range of possible goals 
the Baptist can pursue.183 
2. What’s in it for the Bootlegger? 
The bootlegger is interested in little more than the bottom 
line.184 In most cases, that will mean an increase in profits, 
although the private rewards sought through the government can 
be non-monetary.185 What makes a bootlegger different from 
traditional rent-seekers is the desire to remain behind the 
scenes.186 As a result, some forms of rent-seeking will be 
unavailable to the bootlegger qua bootlegger that would be on the 
menu of any other rent-seeker. 
A bootlegger is likely to have a broad rent-seeking agenda, 
looking for various ways to manipulate the levers of power for its 
own ends. In some situations—particularly those where public 
attention is minimal or entirely absent—the bootlegger will be able 
to operate in the open without the need to minimize its footprint.187 
That will, in turn, increase the bootlegger’s effectiveness in 
maximizing its rent-seeking profits, since it need not temper its 
demands to avoid scrutiny.188 However, when the rents being 
sought arise in an area of government that attracts intense public 
interest or controversy, rent-seeking is less effective if conducted 
in the open.189 The reason is simple—the public would be outraged 
                                                                                                     
 183. Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 188. 
 184. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5 
(“[Bootleggers] are simply in it for the money.”). It is possible, of course, that 
“some Bootleggers might be Baptists, and vice versa,” Adler et al., supra note 153, 
at 320, but the ultimate goals of the two groups are far enough apart that such a 
scenario will almost certainly be the exception, rather than the rule. 
 185. See Adler et al., supra note 153, at 321 (suggesting bootleggers also seek 
regulations decreasing competition). 
 186. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. 
 187. See Adler et al., supra note 153, at 322 (referencing the support the 
Sierra Club received openly from natural gas firms to support initiatives harmful 
to the coal industry). 
 188. Id.  
 189. See, e.g., id. at 322 (“Public health and environmental regulations may 
provide particularly fertile ground for Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions because it can 
be difficult to oppose health and environmental measures openly.”). 
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at open and obvious catering to the wishes of special interests.190 
In those cases, a bootlegger may have to choose whether to act 
through a Baptist or not act at all. In other words, there are many 
situations where a bootlegger chooses between lower rent-seeking 
profits or none at all. The presence of a Baptist—the more vocal 
and convincing, the better—expands the range of rent-seeking 
opportunities for the bootlegger by providing public-interest 
justifications for the bootlegger’s private goals.191 
The symbiotic nature of these peculiar coalitions is explained 
in large part by the fact that neither side can achieve its goals 
without the skills of the other.192 Combining the organizational 
strength of the Baptists with the financial strength of the 
bootleggers reduces the marginal costs for both and widens the 
range of possible victories they can achieve.193 There is another 
reason why these improbable partnerships succeed, however. It is 
that their goals are different in important ways. The Baptist has 
broad goals, driven by lofty moral views of the ideal world.194 
Details are not irrelevant, but they are an afterthought. The 
bootlegger cares little for the overall social purpose of the 
regulation, so long as the details lead to higher payoffs.195 The 
bootlegger will simply choose from the many options for achieving 
the Baptist’s broad goals the route that offers the highest profits, 
and trust that the Baptist’s zeal for the regulation will assure 
reasonable enforcement.196 Both sides will be content with the 
outcome. 
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. 
 191. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 188 (lowering the costs for 
favor-seeking by shielding motives behind public interest motivations). 
 192. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 7 (“[N]either 
well-varnished moral promptings nor unvarnished campaign contributions can 
do the job alone. It takes both.”). 
 193. Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 188. 
 194. Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. 
 195. See Adler et al., supra note 153, at 323 (opining that Bootleggers’ 
interests may coincide with public welfare or may subvert it). 
 196. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5. It is for this 
reason that the original bootlegger and Baptist coalition succeeded. Baptists 
wanted fewer people to consume alcohol, a broad goal that can be achieved in a 
variety of ways. Id. One of those ways, at least in theory, is to curb the ability of 
individuals to obtain alcohol from suppliers. Id. Bootleggers already operate 
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This raises another important question: if both parties are 
pleased with banning alcohol on Sunday, why stop there? Why not 
ban alcohol sales entirely? More broadly, what are the limits to the 
success of the coalition? The answer is that the limits are political. 
The combination of moral outrage and money is potent, but not 
all-powerful, and regulation is certain to be subject to increasing 
marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits.197 The electorate 
will eventually reject even the most convincing Baptist argument 
if the costs rise high enough and the marginal benefits fall low 
enough.198 Moreover, successful regulation requires buy-in from 
the regulator, and regulators have their own incentives. 
3. What’s in it for the Regulator? 
Much has been written about the incentives that regulators 
face.199 They certainly face pressures from many groups, each 
wanting regulations that add to the utility of group members, be 
that direct monetary benefit or some view of social welfare.200 Over 
time, it is possible that regulators develop specific policy 
                                                                                                     
outside the regulatory regime, so they will gladly support restrictions on the 
purchase of alcohol. Id. Baptists demand enforcement of the regulatory 
restrictions and rest easy, content in the belief that fewer people are consuming 
alcohol on Sunday. Id. 
 197. See infra note 342 and accompanying text (explaining how marginal 
benefit can become a negative in the context of information). 
 198. This follows from the foundational economic principle that individuals 
are rational, that they care about increasing benefits and limiting costs to 
themselves. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS 
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 7–10 (2009). Public choice economics teaches that 
individuals maintain that motivation when acting in groups, but that group 
outcomes will not necessarily reflect the same rationality. Id. at 10–20. However, 
even under public choice analysis, costs and benefits remain relevant, and a 
high-cost or low-benefit policy will be disfavored. 
 199. See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (elaborating on the capture theory of regulation to 
explain which groups will be successful in capture); Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976) (arguing that 
regulators can serve the public interest as they balance the demands of competing 
interest groups). 
 200. See Stigler, supra note 199, at 3 (“Regulation may be actively sought by 
an industry, or it may be thrust upon it.”). 
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preferences dictated by one or more interest groups.201 Even taking 
those preferences as a given, however, regulators must still act 
subject to certain external constraints, both in terms of process and 
substance. Understanding the role regulators play in the 
bootlegger and Baptist scenario requires an appreciation of those 
constraints. 
Optimization models are a standard analytical tool of 
economics, typically considering either maximization or 
minimization goals.202 For example, consumers are typically 
thought of as maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint,203 
but they can also be thought of as minimizing costs, subject to a 
minimum level of utility. Regulators are no different, and they are 
often portrayed by public choice analysis as maximizing their 
annual budgets through strategies204 with such interesting names 
                                                                                                     
 201. For a helpful example of how public choice economists view the process 
by which regulators are “captured,” see MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982). 
Early capture theories of regulation were proposed in MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955), and GABRIEL KOLKO, 
THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 
1900–1916 (1963). The theory was later augmented by a formal economic model 
that viewed the regulatory process as an auction between interest groups. Stigler, 
supra note 199, at 3. Many make the mistake of assuming that regulatory capture 
is a danger only from the regulated industry. See, e.g., Prentice & Spence, supra 
note 136, at 1847 (citing Mancur Olson to support the explication that business 
groups exert disproportionate influence over the policy process). However, 
capture merely requires a strong interest in controlling regulatory outcomes and 
that incentive exists not only in industry but a host of other organizations that 
stand to gain power, prestige, or profit if they can nudge regulatory outcomes in 
a particular direction. 
 202. For a description of “optimization models” for non-experts, see 1 KATTA 
G. MURTY, OPTIMIZATION MODELS FOR DECISION-MAKING: JUNIOR LEVEL 9–13 
(2003), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~murty/books/opti_model/junior-1.pdf. 
 203. See BUTLER ET AL., supra note 148, at 7–8 (listing wealth, time, laws of 
nature, knowledge, and choices as important constraints to individual 
opportunity). 
 204. Regulators have various choices when it comes to regulation, including 
formal and informal rulemaking, adjudication, and more. Morriss et. al., have 
argued that regulators continue to experiment with new tools, including 
regulation by litigation and regulation by negotiation. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce 
Yandle, & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
179, 182 (2005) (finding regulation-by-negotiation and regulation-by-litigation 
similar as compared to regulation-by-rulemaking because of the instituted 
procedural differences). More recently, regulators have been experimenting with 
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as the Washington Monument Strategy.205 They can also be 
thought of as seeking to minimize costs, subject to a set of baseline 
goals. Importantly, the costs that regulators seek to minimize are 
their own costs, not the costs imposed on consumers and producers 
by the regulations.206 The minimization effort is also not limited to 
resource costs, but includes the cost of mistakes, the cost of 
enforcement, and political costs.207  
Minimizing mistakes can be thought of in a political sense but 
also in terms of process. Regulators would like to avoid blowback 
from those lawmakers who determine agency funding.208 More 
mistakes typically lead to a more frustrated electorate, which leads 
to increasingly irritated lawmakers and, potentially, lower budgets 
as a result.209 Regulators may also wish to avoid mistakes for the 
same reason that the rest of us do—they do not wish to experience 
the disutility of failure.210 Whether for political or personal 
                                                                                                     
regulation by “Dear Colleague” Letter. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant 
Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, to Title IX 
Coordinators 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) (providing  “guidance to provide recipients with the 
information to assist them in meeting their obligations . . . and implementing 
regulations that [DOE] enforce”). Although fascinating, how regulators choose 
between these strategies is outside of the focus of this research. 
 205. Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 394 
(2009). The Washington Monument Strategy has reference to the actions of the 
National Park Service in the wake of a budget cut in the mid-1980s. Rather than 
attempt to cut waste within the bureaucracy, or even to shutter under-utilized 
national parks, the Park Service chose to close one of the most-visited sites in the 
country, the Washington Monument. Those attempting to gain tickets to ride the 
elevator to the top of the Monument were informed that it was closed due to 
budget cuts and were encouraged to visit their Members of Congress—
conveniently located nearby—and express disapproval that their vacation plans 
had been disrupted. The funding was restored in short order. Government 
agencies are said to be employing the Washington Monument Strategy when they 
choose a “solution” most likely to inconvenience the public and lead for calls to 
raise the agency budget. 
 206. See Morriss et al., supra note 204, at 210–11 (positing that only when 
imposing such costs on consumers or industries generates political costs will the 
agency consider those costs). 
 207. Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13. 
 208. See id. at 16 (referencing empirical studies that suggest the FTC, for 
example, has been less likely to take action against firms in districts represented 
by congressmen who sit on the committee controlling the FTC’s budget). 
 209. Id. at 13. 
 210. Id. 
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reasons, avoidance of mistakes will lead regulators to minimize the 
number of points where decisions must be made and discretion 
exercised.211 
Regulators will also seek to minimize the amount of resources 
that must be expended to enforce the regulations.212 By doing so, 
the agency can claim to be achieving the specific goal while freeing 
up more resources for other goals that the agency is pursuing. The 
easiest way to do this is to promulgate “simple rules requiring 
uniform behavior” because those rules will make compliance 
easier—and violations less likely—but also because detection of 
any rule-breaking will be easier.213 
Finally, regulators seek to minimize the negative impact on 
voters and industries important to powerful legislators.214 
Regulators are motivated to behave in “politically prudent” ways 
by protecting those constituencies.215 Unlike the first two 
cost-minimization efforts, which require adoption of simple 
regulations, this final constraint will not inherently lead to simple 
rules. It will, however, lead to rules favoring those interests that 
legislators prefer.216 Bootleggers will have contributed monetarily 
to those legislators, and the Baptists’ moral suasion will have 
impressed some legislators or, at the very least, convinced cynical 
legislators that appearing to favor Baptists’ interest will positively 
influence electoral results.217 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. Rules requiring uniform behavior are also more likely to be viewed as 
inherently fair, even though that perception is likely to be false, given the various 
complex and heterogeneous relationships that the regulations will have to govern. 
Id. 
 214. See, e.g., Morriss et al., supra note 204, at 211 (discussing the political 
costs of regulations that impose regressive taxes). 
 215. See Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13 (suggesting 
legislators are unlikely to be supportive of regulators who harm the industries 
and workers in that legislator’s district). 
 216. See Morriss et al., supra note 204, at 193 (“Accountability to the political 
branches is not perfect, of course, but agencies must take the views of members 
of Congress and the President into account in shaping regulations.”). 
 217. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 7 (speculating 
that the canny politician could make a “Baptist” appeal to “enable voters to feel 
better by endorsing socially accepted value” while pocketing bootlegger money). 
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Regulators will therefore implement rules that will benefit 
both Baptists and bootleggers, so long as there is a simple rule that 
does both.218 Importantly, though, nothing in the Bootlegger and 
Baptist Theory requires the view that regulators are just cynical 
mercenaries, selling out their preferences to the legislator that 
yells the loudest or the lobbyist that talks the smoothest.219 The 
influence of the Baptist allows the regulator to credibly claim—and 
believe—that there are actual solutions at hand for the problems 
the agency was ostensibly created to solve.220 When the solutions 
fail, as they inevitably do—whether the result of quackery or 
bootlegging221—the complexity of the system being regulated gives 
the regulator plenty of cover for claiming good faith in developing 
the rule in the first place. 
The conditions that lead to quackery can also impact a 
regulator’s incentives. Regulators’ preference for simplicity and 
easy enforcement must be balanced against the demands of 
legislators even in the best of times, but in the wake of a crisis the 
pressures on regulators increase just as dramatically on regulators 
as on legislators.222 Some actions taken in the wake of a crisis may 
be mere regulator negligence—regulatory quackery—but a savvy 
                                                                                                     
 218. Many people argue that the regulatory state is destroying the American 
economy under the weight of a complex regulatory regime. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, 
Rent-Seeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 77 (2015) (arguing that in the current “crony capitalist” system rent-seeking 
is turned on its head and the government creates and distributes rents to itself 
and favored interests). However, this argument need not be contradictory to the 
claims presented above. Instead, the combined weight of an excess amount of 
simple rules can still result in great complexity. 
 219. Nothing in the Bootleggers and Baptist Theory completely discounts this 
possibility either, so that mercenary regulators are entirely possible and plausible 
within the theory. See generally Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, 
at 13 (introducing the Bootleggers and Baptist theory). 
 220. See Yandle, Bootleggers in Retrospect, supra note 158, at 5 (“Baptists 
point to the moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable 
public benefits promised by a desired regulation.”). 
 221. With mere quackery, failure is largely guaranteed, given the haphazard 
way in which the policy is chosen. Supra Part II.C. With bootlegging, on the other 
hand, failure is likely because the policy has been specifically crafted to achieve 
goals outside of those perceived by the public.  
 222. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1785 (arguing that when bubbles burst, 
investigators turning up excesses and abuses in the regulatory system creates 
populist pressure for new regulation).  
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bootlegger would realize the opportunity presented by the crisis.223 
As the Baptists whip the public and legislators into an atmosphere 
where inaction is simply not feasible, bootleggers will be working 
to assure that their interests are advanced.224 The crisis 
atmosphere will increase the regulator’s willingness to accept any 
solution that ostensibly meets the Baptists’ goals.225 The 
bootlegger, having a detailed understanding of its own interests 
and the ways in which the system can be manipulated for its 
benefit, can provide the regulator with simple and easy-to-enforce 
rules that will be snatched up by the regulator who needs a quick 
fix.226 
B. How to Spot a Bootlegger 
When the interests of bootlegger, Baptist, and regulator all 
coincide, laws will be passed and rules will be promulgated that 
allow the Baptist to declare an initial victory while adding to the 
bottom line of the bootlegger. The question remains: how can we 
know when regulatory policy is the result of bootlegging? The task 
is difficult because the bootlegger must remain in the shadows.227 
Following the money will typically be inconclusive, because 
political contributions are made for a variety of reasons228 and 
teasing out precise motivations is often a fool’s errand. 
                                                                                                     
 223. After all, in the midst of a crisis politicians will feel immense pressure to 
craft some form of response, even if that response does not directly address the 
problems that arise. Id. at 1785–86. 
 224. See, e.g., id. at 1786 (“Because such periods typically involve an upswing 
in populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for action, they offer 
‘windows of opportunity’ to well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their 
preferred, ready-made solutions when there is little time for reflective 
deliberation.”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 188. 
 228. Indeed, as the reach of government expands, it is likely that political 
contributions—both in terms of total dollar amounts and the number and breadth 
of those contributing—will continue to rise. After all, it is the ability of 
government to bestow favors that draws rent-seeking behavior, not the other way 
around. See generally Tullock, supra note 160 (introducing the concept of rent-
seeking whereby well-organized interests pursue government favors). 
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Baptists are usually quite easy to spot—they aggressively 
court public opinion and explain the moral necessity of the 
proposed change.229 It is not a significant exaggeration to say that 
the difficulty with Baptists is not identifying them, but rather in 
finding a way to tune them out. The same cannot be said of 
bootleggers, since they must try to avoid public scrutiny if they 
wish to maximize the likelihood of achieving their goals.230 Because 
they will be doing their best to avoid identification, how can we 
identify them? By building a circumstantial case that includes 
identifying failed policies that persist in a way that suggest the 
presence of a bootlegger and identifying the actual results of the 
policy and those that benefit from the policy’s unstated goals.231  
Given any social problem and a desire to fix it, there are 
numerous possible paths that can be chosen;232 how do government 
agents choose a path? An idealistic view of regulation posits that 
legislators and regulators will make their choice after long 
consultation with all relevant parties, exhaustive economic 
analysis, and careful consideration of all social and cultural 
impacts.233 It is possible, as explained by the quackery hypothesis, 
that the choice was made in haphazard fashion in the wake of a 
crisis and with little consideration for whether it will work.234 
However, it is also possible that the choice was made to reward 
                                                                                                     
 229. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 148, at 194 (drawing the comparison of 
environmental activists to the Baptist for the “moralistic attitude they adopt”). 
 230. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 153, at 360 (depicting states and 
bondholders as bootleggers operating in the shadows of e-cigarette regulations 
because of the needed revenue provided by traditional cigarette smokers). 
 231. Yandle argues that government “rarely accomplish[es] its stated goals at 
lowest costs” and that “regulators seem dedicated to choosing the highest-cost 
approach they can find.” Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 13. 
One need not adopt that position, however, to appreciate that government rarely 
achieves its goals fully or in a cost-effective manner. 
 232. See Morriss et al., supra note 204, at 179–83 (listing the pros and cons of 
forms of regulating, and attempting to provide a theory for explaining agency 
choice on the method of regulation). 
 233. See id. at 214–16 (explaining the public interest theory of regulation). 
The theory accepts that decisionmakers are flawed and, as a result, there will be 
mistakes and even “deliberate acts of chicanery,” id. at 215, but the final decision 
is presumed to be the result of this form of careful deliberation. 
 234. Supra Part II.C. 
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those who were most persuasive in their rent-seeking.235 This 
latter possibility is often overlooked, but it provides an alternative 
answer to the conclusion that government is merely inept. It is not 
inept; rather, it is pursuing non-obvious goals, and by identifying 
which individuals or entities would benefit financially from the 
rules, we can identify potential bootleggers. 
At least two words of caution are appropriate at this juncture. 
First, following the necessity of separating correlation from 
causation, evidence that a benefit is derived from legislative or 
regulatory action is not proof that the benefitted party is a 
bootlegger. That evidence introduces the possibility that the 
benefitted party is a bootlegger, but it is not conclusive. In other 
words, benefitting from a failed policy is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. Second, in attempting to identify those parties 
that benefit from seemingly failed regulation, it is unwise to 
discount those individuals or entities who bear some portion of the 
regulatory burden. Although it appears contradictory that burdens 
can be benefits, regulations are often sought by those to be 
regulated because the regulations can provide benefits in the form 
of barriers to competition, standardized risk, and so on.236 
C. Bootleggers or Quacks? 
With an understanding of the Bootlegger and Baptist Theory, 
we can return to the question of whether Dodd–Frank’s regulation 
of hedge funds is mere regulatory quackery or more interesting—
and sinister—bootlegging. Bainbridge identifies anticorporate 
populists as the motivating force behind Dodd–Frank’s corporate 
governance quackery,237 and hedge funds faced similar populist 
                                                                                                     
 235. See Morriss et al., supra note 204, at 220 (explaining Stigler’s economic 
theory of regulation as viewing the legislative process as an auction where the 
highest bidder dictates the contents of legislation). 
 236. See Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists, supra note 6, at 12–13 (providing 
real-life scenarios where regulated firms sought regulations for the individual 
benefits they provided, the observation of which led to his Bootlegger and Baptist 
theory). 
 237. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1784–86. An important question, which we 
leave for another day, is whether those “policy entrepreneurs,” id. at 1786, are 
more properly defined as bootleggers or, perhaps, the vocal Baptists giving cover 
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anger in the wake of the financial crisis.238 These populists may be 
nothing more than committed—if incorrect—idealists who believe 
that corporations are detrimental to society. If so, and if they acted 
alone, then hedge fund regulation is mere negligence—regulatory 
quackery.239 However, it is possible that anti-corporate populists 
or other, less noticeable groups, understood the importance of 
using a crisis for advancing previously obstructed goals and 
manipulated Dodd–Frank to extract additional benefits for 
themselves.240 If so, then the menace is bootlegging, rather than 
quackery. 
The rest of this Article will be devoted to answering this 
question by applying the tools of public choice to Dodd–Frank’s 
hedge fund rules. After analyzing the nature of hedge funds in the 
context of the recent financial crisis, Dodd–Frank regulations 
appear as destined for failure as the quackery of corporate 
governance changes identified by Romano in Sarbanes–Oxley and 
Bainbridge in Dodd–Frank. The inevitable failure, however, seems 
poised to benefit certain groups in a way that seems more than 
coincidental, indicating the presence of bootlegging.  
IV. What is a Hedge Fund? 
Beyond the fact that hedge funds are involved in financial 
markets, most people might not know exactly what a hedge fund 
is and does. Media and political mentions of hedge funds are likely 
                                                                                                     
for more careful bootleggers. 
 238. See Walter Hamilton, Tina Susman & Tom Petruno, A Strong Message 
to Wall Street; The 150-Year Sentence for Bernard Madoff Reflects a Harsher 
Stance Against Financial Crime. Victims Cheer, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1 
(attributing Madoff’s harsh sentence to the public outrage directed at hedge funds 
amidst public scandals and the financial crisis). 
 239. Title IV of Dodd–Frank authorized the SEC to require the registration of 
hedge funds and adopt controversial disclosure and reporting obligations. Wulf A. 
Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 250–51 
(2013). 
 240. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1786 (“Because such periods typically 
involve an upswing in populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure 
for action, they offer ‘windows of opportunity to well-positioned policy 
entrepreneurs to market their preferred, ready-made solutions when there is 
little time for reflective deliberation.”). 
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to be long on invective and short on details, possibly because the 
speaker knows as little about hedge funds as the average 
American. Nor is it a shameful thing to have difficulty elaborating 
on what a hedge fund is, considering hedge funds tend to be more 
easily defined by what they are not than what they are.  
There are as many investment strategies as there are hedge 
funds, maybe more; what unifies them is that they have 
historically all been exempt from the Investment Company Act 
(ICA).241 Being exempt means having significant competitive 
advantages over those investment companies that must register 
under the ICA. For example, an exempt entity avoids registration 
requirements, which lowers their overall cost of doing business. An 
exempt entity would also avoid restrictions on who it can employ 
in management positions, which means it has flexibility in hiring 
the best people for the job. 
More important than flexibility in their human resources 
departments, hedge funds also enjoy greater flexibility in financial 
markets. They avoid the Investment Company Act’s restrictions on 
the types of investment and mandated procedures for changing 
direction. For example, unlike traditional investment firms, hedge 
funds have historically been allowed to purchase securities on 
margin, engage in joint purchases, and sell securities short.242 
Hedge funds could also change their investment strategies at will, 
a freedom not enjoyed by investment companies that must register 
under the ICA.243 
This increased flexibility opens the door for hedge funds to 
achieve greater returns for their investors, but those returns are 
achieved through exposure to additional risk. Because of that risk, 
and because there is uncertainty associated with new investment 
options, hedge funds must offer higher profits to entice investors 
to accept hedge funds as a legitimate substitute investment option. 
As mentioned, being exempt from the ICA grants some 
                                                                                                     
 241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64 (2012). 
 242. See id. § 80a-12 (making it unlawful for a registered investment company 
to purchase any security on margin, engage in joint trading accounts, or short 
sale a security). 
 243. See id. § 80a-13 (regulating the ability of registered investment 
companies to change their investment policies as those policies deviate from the 
recited policies in the registration statement of such investment companies). 
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opportunities for achieving higher profits, but some hedge funds 
have sought higher returns by making bold moves as influential 
shareholders in major corporations.244 
When hedge funds are successful, the resulting business 
decisions might be beneficial, or they might be harmful. Only in 
the long run will it be evident which, and the hedge fund will likely 
have taken its gains and moved on to the next source of profit. A 
skeptic could argue that there are only a finite number of 
easy-profit changes to be made and that, once those changes have 
been enacted, additional pressures for high profits in the short 
term are likely to do more harm than good. On the other hand, it 
is hardly an easy task to identify the point at which innovation 
becomes harmful. Aversion to change can be motivated as much by 
fear or a desire to protect some preferred group of investors or 
management as by a concern for the overall health of the market 
or individual businesses. It is for that reason that hedge-fund 
regulation under Dodd–Frank is potentially harmful as a 
protectionist endeavor. 
V. The Great Recession and the Birth of Dodd–Frank 
In the wake of the financial meltdown of 2008–2009, there was 
tremendous pressure on policymakers to take action to make sure 
that the experience was never repeated.245 That pressure was 
                                                                                                     
 244. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024–25 (2007) 
(discussing specific instances in which hedge funds have exerted corporate control 
and played a role in corporate governance). Most hedge funds do not pursue this 
type of bold shareholder action, but the impact of the minority that do is enough 
to make directors nervous about the impact of activist hedge funds on their 
companies. See id. at 1026 (“The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper of record for 
executives, bankers, and investment professionals, calls hedge funds the ‘new 
leader’ on the ‘list of bogeymen haunting the corporate bedroom.’”). 
 245. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1782–83 (discussing the 
“boom-bust-regulate” pattern following market tumult and the outrage 
prompting Congress to regulate in such cases). One possible response is that 
without knowing the exact causes of the financial collapse—a tall order when 
financial markets and the economy, as a whole, are incredibly complex—there is 
little reason to suspect that any solution will be able to achieve the goal of 
stabilizing markets. That is, however, somewhat beside the point, in that 
politicians feel pressure to do something in the wake of a crisis and their reliance 
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substantiated in the form of Dodd–Frank, in part, because of a 
report issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.246 The 
ultimate form of Dodd–Frank was, no doubt, influenced by more 
than the Treasury Report, and it is certain that special interests 
took the now famous (or infamous) advice of former White House 
Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel: “never let a crisis go to waste.”247 
In fact, combining the complex subject matter of the legislation—
financial markets—and the timing of the legislation—in the wake 
of a severe economic crisis—it is unsurprising that the stated 
purposes of Dodd–Frank do not map perfectly onto the actual 
legislative contours of the Act.248 
A. Overarching Goals 
Notwithstanding some extraneous provisions, the clear sense 
of purpose inherent in Dodd–Frank is an attempt to stop a repeat 
of the financial crisis and subsequent meltdown. The stated aim of 
the legislation is:  
                                                                                                     
on public good will for the continuation of their employment is almost certain to 
force them to craft a policy response. See id. at 1785–86 (discussing populist 
pressures in the wake of “when the bubble inevitably bursts”); Ribstein, supra 
note 45, at 79 (examining interest group power when market crashes occur and 
the resulting populism considered by reformers). 
 246. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM 2–4 (2009) (proposing reforms to promote supervision and 
regulation of firms and financial markets, protect consumers and investors, 
provide the government to manage financial turmoil, and raise standards and 
create cooperation on the international level). 
 247. See Gerald F. Sieb, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL STREET J. 
(Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2017) (discussing President Obama’s, and his team’s, opportunity 
for reforms during the economic downturn in 2009) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). For example, it is hard to see anything other than targeted 
rent-seeking as the justification for including a requirement that manufacturers 
identify minerals sourced from the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Dodd–
Frank, Pub. L. No 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010) (discussing 
the requirement that reports be provided for imported minerals and their 
relationship to violence in or near the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 248. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, The Rule of Law During Times of Economic Crisis 
(Geo. Mas. Univ. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, LS 15-09, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651893 8–9 (arguing that economic crises lead to policy 
changes not entirely explained by the context of the crisis). 
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To promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.249 
This language is supported by the structure of Dodd–Frank, which 
reorganizes and consolidates oversight authority over financial 
markets, establishes new regulatory entities tasked with assuring 
financial stability, and creates an entirely new entity tasked with 
protecting consumers from abuse by financial markets.250 Even 
some who disagree vehemently with the specific choices made in 
enacting Dodd–Frank and the regulations since promulgated 
appear to concede the laudable aims of the legislation.251 
B. Criticism in the 111th Congress 
Hedge funds have been part of the debate about systemic risk 
and the stability of financial markets even before the collapse of 
2008–2009, with criticisms often invoking the collapse of Long 
Term Capital Management in 1998 and its aftermath. Since then, 
other hedge funds have become infamous for similar practices and 
outcomes.252 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that hedge 
funds were included in a bill as massive and far-reaching as Dodd–
                                                                                                     
 249. Dodd–Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 250. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321, 5342 (2012) (establishing the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and Office of Financial Research); id. § 5491 (establishing the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection).  
 251. See, e.g., Iain Murray, How Dodd–Frank Harms Main Street 1 (Nat’l Ctr. 
for Pol’y Analysis, Issue Brief No. 173, 2015) (“The reforms enshrined in [Dodd–
Frank] . . . were intended to protect Main Street and consumers from financial 
predation by Wall Street.”); The Dodd–Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More 
Stable? Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 114th Cong. 111 (2015) (statement of 
Todd Zywicki, Professor, George Mason University School of Law) (“An animating 
premise of [Dodd–Frank] was the belief that a primary source of financial 
instability was an inadequate consumer financial protection regime at the federal 
level.”). 
 252. Magnetar and Amaranth, just to name two. For a more in-depth 
discussion, see Wulf A. Kaal, The Systematic Risk of Private Funds After the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 163 (2015)  (discussing 
blame placed on the private fund industry for destabilizing the economy as a 
result of excessive risk). 
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Frank. There were scholarly opinions regarding the need for 
reform,253 including some who rejected claims that hedge funds 
were to blame for the collapse.254 Out of those who actively spoke 
out about hedge funds, however, the majority appear to line up 
against hedge funds and in favor of regulation.255 Interestingly 
enough, however, political debate in the lead up to passage of 
Dodd–Frank is largely silent on hedge funds. 
To be certain, hedge funds did become part of the debate, and 
in bipartisan fashion. For example, on January 29, 2009, 
Republican Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin introduced 
S. 344, the Hedge Fund Transparency Act.256 In his remarks, 
Senator Grassley bemoaned the fact that hedge funds were allowed 
to operate under a “cloak of secrecy” and argued that the SEC 
required registration and disclosure from hedge funds “in order to 
protect the markets.”257 Notably, he failed to offer any specifics as 
to why hedge fund regulation and disclosure was essential to 
protect the market, but he did imply that hedge fund opposition to 
the measure was evidence of wrongdoing.258 Senator Levin, on the 
                                                                                                     
 253. Id. 
 254. See, e.g., Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis of 2007–2008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 16 (2009) (“[H]edge funds have played 
only a minor role in the current financial crisis, as evidenced by the lack of 
attention they have received in the government’s recent bailout efforts.”); Roberta 
Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment 3 (Yale L. & 
Econ. Res. Paper, No. 414, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1697348 [hereinafter Romano, Against Financial Regulation 
Harmonization] (“[T]here is an absence of evidence pointing to hedge funds as a 
contributing factor in the recent financial panic.”). 
 255. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 392–94 (2011) [hereinafter Kaal, Basel III] (describing the 
range of proposed regulatory solutions). 
 256. Hedge Fund Transparency Act, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 257. 155 CONG. REC. S1058–59 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley). 
 258. See id. at S1059 (“[T]his legislation hasn’t had many friends. These funds 
don’t want people to know what they do or who participates in them. . . . Well, I 
think that is all the more reason to shed some light . . . on them to see what they 
are doing.”). Senator Levin went one step further, implying wrongdoing by the 
simple fact that hedge funds had structured their business model according to the 
law itself, in order to make sure they were not covered by the regulations. Id. at 
S1059–60 (statement of Sen. Levin) (“By limiting the number of their beneficial 
owners and accepting funds only from investors of means, hedge funds have been 
able to . . . operate outside of the reach of the Securities and Exchange 
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other hand, argued specifically that hedge funds had gotten so big 
that they posed a systemic risk,259 but size alone should not 
increase systemic risk.  
It is also not clear whether the data supports Senator Levin’s 
assertions. For example, while he cites a Congressional Research 
Study that puts the total market share of hedge funds at five 
percent of assets under management,260 he fails to mention that 
there are estimated to be somewhere between ten and fifteen 
thousand hedge funds,261 making the market impact of any 
individual hedge fund effectively zero. Moreover, the “secrecy”262 of 
hedge funds that Senator Grassley criticizes exists between hedge 
funds, as each one attempts to adopt a unique strategy that will 
                                                                                                     
Commission.”). 
 259. See id. at S1060 (“The problem is that hedge funds have gotten so big 
and are so entrenched in U.S. financial markets that their actions can now 
significantly impact market prices, damage other market participants, and can 
even endanger the U.S. financial system and the economy as a whole.”). Senator 
Levin also argued that there was a risk associated with pension funds investing 
in hedge funds, id. at S1060 (discussing pension fund investment in hedge funds), 
but any discussion of pension funds is incomplete without a hard look at the 
reasons why pension funds are looking at hedge funds. For example, the Missouri 
State Employees Retirement System has allegedly invested thirty percent of its 
assets in hedge funds, but it is also only seventy-three percent funded with over 
three billion dollars in unfunded liabilities. ANDREW BIGGS, THE FUNDING STATUS 
OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSIONS IN MISSOURI 15 (2015), 
http://bit.ly/2j9y1O7. If the pension fund is presumed to be obtaining only those 
returns offered by safe investments, like corporate bonds, the situation appears 
even more dire, with funding at only forty-five percent and an unfunded liability 
in excess of nine billion dollars. Id. at 18. It is the history of politicians choosing 
to underfund the pension plan, not anything done by the hedge funds—who 
merely offer the higher rate of return the pension plan needs to avoid insolvency—
which has led to what Senator Levin believes is an overinvestment in hedge 
funds. 
 260. See 155 CONG. REC. S1060 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) (citing the study). 
 261. See Julia La Roche, Hedge Funds—There Are Too Many of Them and 
Most of Them Are Lousy, YAHOO! FIN. (May 7, 2016), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/are-there-too-many-hedge-funds-193953003.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (suggesting that there are too many hedge funds and 
most are unable to perform adequately) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 262. See 155 CONG. REC. S1059 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley) (discussing a bill Senator Grassley previously introduced to close a 
loophole which hedge funds have been able to utilize to operate in secrecy). 
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give them an edge. The hedge fund industry is likely one of the 
most diversified in the financial markets, limiting the impact that 
any negative market even can have on the hedge fund industry, 
much less the financial markets, at large.263 
Levin also argued that hedge fund compensation encouraged 
risk,264 but he gets the causal arrow the wrong way around. Hedge 
funds need higher returns to attract investors, and higher risk is 
the only way to achieve those returns, so the compensation 
package is structured to achieve the efficient level of risk. More to 
the point, the risk Senator Levin describes is borne by investors 
who have voluntarily joined this venture, a point he effectively 
concedes,265 yet then proceeds to tell the horror story of Long Term 
Capital Management.266 That story is convenient for both quacks 
and bootleggers, because government action—a bailout—
prevented an actual conclusion to the story. Quacks like Senator 
Levin assure us that a bailout was necessary, and they are free to 
wax eloquent about the dangers of large hedge funds and the need 
for regulation precisely because he and others refuse to let market 
forces punish bad behavior. As a counter to his argument about 
size, more recent research has concluded that other large hedge 
fund failures, such as Amaranth, imposed no widespread burdens 
on the financial system.267 
Senator Levin’s final argument was that traditional banks had 
begun to form their own hedge funds and that the incestuous 
                                                                                                     
 263. See Joe Burns, Why Now Might Be The Right Time to Look At Hedge 
Funds, CNBC (June 20, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/19/why-now-might-
be-the-right-time-to-look-at-hedge-funds.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) 
(discussing the advantages that investors can gain by investing in hedge funds, 
including diversification) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 264. See 155 CONG. REC. S1060 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) (“The compensation system employed by most hedge funds encourages 
that risk taking.”). 
 265. See id. (“[I]f wealthy people want to take big risks with their money, all 
else being equal, they should be allowed to do so without the safeguards normally 
required for the general public.”).  
 266. See id. (discussing the Federal Reserve’s rescue of Long-Term Capital 
Management when the company began to falter while having a total market 
proposition of $1.3 trillion). 
 267. See Kaal, Basel III, supra note 255, at 394–95 (suggesting that the 
collapse of large hedge funds did not cause systemic problems). 
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relationship was potentially harmful.268 This is the only argument 
with teeth, yet, even if true, it would only support a rule that 
requires strict separation between traditional, regulated 
investment firms and the hedge funds that are operated under the 
same holding company. Dodd–Frank did include the Volcker 
Rule,269 which not only prohibited proprietary trading by banks, 
but also prohibited banks from “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any 
equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] 
a hedge fund or a private equity fund,”270 so nothing else should 
have been required, yet additional regulations were piled on. 
This type of heavy-on-rhetoric, light-on-substance criticism of 
hedge funds continued throughout the 111th Congress, and in 
some unusual places. For example, hedge fund manager 
compensation is often in the form of carried interest, so taxation of 
carried interest became a popular subject and was raised during 
debates over entirely unrelated bills, such as: (1) the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009;271 (2) the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act;272 (3) the Healthy, 
Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010;273 and (4) the Federal Aviation 
                                                                                                     
 268. See 155 CONG. REC. S1060 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) 
Because of their ownership, their size and reach, their clientele, and 
the high-risk nature of their investments, the failure of hedge funds 
today can imperil not only their direct investors, but also the financial 
institutions that own them, that lent them money, or did business with 
them. From there, the effects can ripple through the markets and 
impact the entire economy. 
 269. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012) (“Prohibitions on proprietary trading and 
certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds.”). 
 270. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B). 
 271. See 155 CONG. REC. S875 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Webb) (proposing to replace a tax on cigarettes with a higher tax on carried 
interest, “which is the compensation received by hedge fund managers”). 
 272. See id. at S1625 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“Our 
regulators need to have the tools and resources to get the job done. We have seen 
the problems with the unregulated hedge funds, private equity concerns, and the 
lack of enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). 
 273. See 156 CONG. REC. H7802 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Andrews) (arguing that a hedge fund manager who has lunch “at the priciest 
restaurant in Manhattan, maybe a $200 or $300 lunch” can afford a higher tax 
rate on carried interest). 
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Administration Reauthorization.274 One of the most common 
claims was that because of the tax treatment of carried interest, 
hedge fund managers “who make more than $1 billion a year now 
pay a lower effective tax rate than many teachers, nurses, 
firefighters, and police officers.”275 
Hedge funds were mentioned in every manner of negative 
association, such as the legitimate reminder that Bernie Madoff 
was a hedge fund manager.276 Of course, there is no evidence that 
other hedge funds were operating similar schemes, but that was 
apparently no reason to avoid repetition of the “Ponzi scheme” 
accusation.277 There were accusations of hedge fund “gambling” in 
a speech opposing repeal of the estate tax,278 and other accusations 
of “manipulating markets.”279 In fact, they were a space-holder for 
anything perceived to be wrong with Wall Street; when criticizing 
                                                                                                     
 274. See id. at S1704 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) 
I suppose for somebody who makes $3.6 billion in a year, which is $300 
million a month or $10 million a day, and that person, who incidentally 
was the highest income earner running a hedge fund in 2008, that 
person not only got $10 million a day in income but, because of the 
generosity of this Chamber and others, gets to pay a 15-percent rate, 
one of the lowest income tax rates. 
 275. See id. at S7343 (daily ed. Sep. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Sanders) 
(discussing unfairness of the federal tax code); see also 155 CONG. REC. H514 
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kucinich) (“The obscenity of hedge 
fund managers paying a tax rate of about 15 percent for most of a billion plus in 
income while some who clean our bedpans pay a higher tax rate . . . is: greed and 
a repudiation of the merit of hard work.”). 
 276. See 155 CONG. REC. S1654 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer) (“If you believe that, I have a hedge fund I would like you to invest in 
called Madoff Securities, LLC.”). 
 277. See id. at H145 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kucinich) (“We 
also have to address the issue of the fractional reserve system, which is how banks 
create money out of thin air. And then, as they do that, they’ve created the 
conditions where we’ve had this kind of Ponzi scheme collapsing, banks and the 
hedge funds working together.”). 
 278. See 156 CONG. REC. S6054 (daily ed. July 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Sanders) (“Do you remember those hedge fund managers on Wall Street who 
made $1 billion a year or several billion a year? They are going to benefit. Those 
are the guys—the people who drove us into the recession, who made huge 
amounts of money gambling on Wall Street.”). 
 279. See 155 CONG. REC. S3359 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Harkin) (referring to Americans’ view of “hedge fund hotshots” as manipulating 
markets and becoming further prosperous as a result). 
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taxpayer bailouts of Wall Street, the plan was described as a 
“massive transfer of wealth from the American people to the hedge 
funds on Wall Street,”280 even though hedge funds make up a tiny 
fraction of our capital markets. They were portrayed as completely 
indifferent to any negative impacts on individuals in the 
economy281 and even as a likely source of future financial 
bubbles.282 
The accusations got even more bizarre. Hedge funds were 
accused of massive tax avoidance.283 They were accused of being a 
big part of the problem with for-profit education.284 They were 
accused of bankrupting Chrysler just for insisting on their rights 
as secured creditors.285 They were even used as an excuse to oppose 
cap-and-trade as a solution to global climate change, because 
hedge funds would simply find a way to profit off the system.286 
                                                                                                     
 280. Id. at H3753 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of Rep. Sherman) 
(arguing that because Wall Street takes six percent of the risk and fifty percent 
of the profits under plans to bail out Wall Street, wealth is transferred from the 
American people to hedge funds). 
 281. See id. at S9651 (daily ed. Sep. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Sanders) 
(stating that hedge fund managers do not care about disintegrating 
manufacturing, that millions have lost jobs, that small businesses cannot get 
credit, or about trying to build a productive economy). 
 282. See 156 CONG. REC. H8036 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Stearns) (“The Fed’s QE2 plan could . . . also create bubbles as hedge funds and 
other speculators borrow cheaply and make even bigger bets on stocks and 
commodities.”). 
 283. See 155 CONG. REC. S2629 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) (discussing how hedge funds utilize offshore entities, even though they are 
managed and controlled in the United States, resulting in an offloading of their 
tax burden on those entities that follow the rules). 
 284. See 156 CONG. REC. S8987 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Harkin) (“Another 33 for-profit education companies operating 65 more for-profit 
schools are at least partially owned by private equity investors or hedge funds. 
The result is that the vast majority of for-profit schools have prioritized growth 
over education in order to satisfy the demands of their investors.”). 
 285. See 155 CONG. REC. H5047 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Miller) (“[B]ankruptcy will now be required only because of the greed of a few 
Wall Street hedge funds that held a portion of Chrysler’s debt.”). 
 286. See id. at S7601 (daily ed. July 16, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) 
(“Such a [cap-and-trade] system is ripe for the biggest investment banks and the 
biggest hedge funds in the country to sink their teeth into these marketplaces and 
make massive amounts of money.”). 
QUACKS OR BOOTLEGGERS 425 
 
In discussing the financial collapse and mortgages, hedge 
funds were regularly featured, though usually with vague 
attribution of guilt, such as calling them part of some “dark money” 
cabal,287 implying that the mere purchase of risky mortgages made 
them responsible,288 or even that hedge funds—as speculators—
were hoping that people would default on their mortgages.289 On 
this last claim, a certain story appeared in occasional speeches and 
debates, that a “hedge fund billionaire” had called up his friends 
at Goldman Sachs and asked them to put together a package of 
sub-prime mortgages that would likely default.290 The hedge fund 
manager would then sell the investments while betting against 
that package to make money.291 The story is obviously that of the 
Goldman Sachs ABACUS deal292 and, while many of the general 
                                                                                                     
 287. See id. at S330 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (“We 
are not going to look at derivatives, we will not regulate derivatives, and we are 
not going to regulate hedge funds. We are willing to countenance a lot of dark 
money out there because we do not need to see it.”). 
 288. See 156 CONG. REC. S4405 (daily ed. May 26, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Dorgan) (suggesting that the sale of risky mortgages to hedge funds made 
everyone involved massive amounts of money but that this “cesspool of greed” was 
“steering this country into the ditch” and ended in the suffering of the American 
people). While it is true that the purchase of risky mortgages by hedge funds did 
contribute to mortgage companies being “awash in cash,” id. at S141 (daily ed. 
Jan. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dorgan), that no more makes hedge funds 
responsible for the collapse than those who eat at mafia-owned restaurants are 
responsible for the criminal acts of those who are, as a result, awash in cash to 
fund their illicit activities. 
 289. See 155 CONG. REC. H5141 (daily ed. May 5, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Boccieri) (“We had hedge fund operators betting on the price of fuel going up; we 
had folks who were investing and betting on the price of food going up . . . and we 
had hedge funds that were betting that people would not be able to pay their 
mortgage.”). 
 290. See 156 CONG. REC. H4665 (daily ed. June 22, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Welch) (giving an example of the recklessness of Wall Street banks that 
contributed to the financial crisis); see also id. at H2647 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2010) 
(statement of Rep. Stearns) (discussing Goldman Sachs putting together 
sub-prime mortgage packages); id. at H2803 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2010) (statement 
of Rep. DeFazio) (same). 
 291. See id. at H4665 (daily ed. June 22, 2010) (statement of Rep. Welch) 
(discussing hedge fund betting against Goldman Sachs’s ABACUS sub-prime 
mortgage packages without telling investors). 
 292. See Factbox: How Goldman’s ABACUS deal worked, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 
2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldmansachs-abacus-factbox/factbox-
how-goldmans-abacus-deal-worked-idUSTRE63F5CZ20100416 (last visited Feb. 
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parts of the story are accurate, Congressional Democrats hedged 
enough on the specifics to make it falsely appear: (1) almost 
exclusively the fault of the hedge fund; and (2) a harmful outcome 
that all hedge funds might pursue if not regulated.293 
C. From Criticizing to Legislating 
These and other criticisms of hedge funds found their way into 
Congressional hearings and, eventually, substantive legislation. 
For example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs considered banning investing by hedge 
funds in commodities markets294 and highlighted a report alleging 
that hedge fund Amaranth Advisors LLC manipulated natural gas 
markets in 2006.295 The Committee also held hearings on an 
alleged practice of hedge funds establishing themselves as foreign 
entities to avoid paying U.S. taxes, even though hedge fund 
managers and other officials were based in the U.S.296 In the 
debates leading up to the passage of the Helping Families Save 
Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009,297 it was alleged that 
hedge funds were partially to blame for the financial crisis, but 
only because institutional investors had been attracted to the 
higher returns yielded by riskier investments.298 
                                                                                                     
17, 2018) (explaining how the ABACUS deal worked according to the SEC fraud 
complaint against Goldman Sachs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 293. For example, Goldman Sachs chose to keep the identity of Paulson & Co. 
from its investors, but there is no evidence that the idea was Paulson’s. Most of 
the harms appear to have come from choices made by Goldman Sachs, not 
Paulson & Co. See id. (explaining the SEC view of the ABACUS deal). 
 294. See S. REP. NO. 111-360, at 27 (2010) (discussing “the impact of financial 
speculation by hedge funds as a factor in rising food and fuel costs”). 
 295. See id. at 143 (discussing excessive speculation in the natural gas 
market). 
 296. See id. at 156–57, 159 (discussing how entities avoid U.S. taxes by going 
offshore and proposals to eliminate tax havens and abuses). 
 297. Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009). 
 298. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-19, at 17 (2009) (discussing the impact of the 
housing crisis on the mortgage industry). Even if true, this claim would support 
a ban on all high-risk investments and doing so would place an effective ceiling 
on U.S. economic development and innovation. 
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The primary activity on hedge fund regulation during the 
111th Congress, however, was Dodd–Frank, which was cobbled 
together from multiple bills originating in the House and Senate 
and regulates hedge funds in four primary ways. First, it requires 
registration of hedge fund advisors by eliminating the private 
advisor exemption under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.299 
Second, it requires advisors to maintain detailed information 
regarding assets under management, use of leverage and 
investment positions held by the fund, trading practices, 
counterparty risk exposure, valuation policies and practices, and 
any side arrangements, and grants the SEC the power to mandate 
regular reports and audit hedge funds.300 These collection and 
reporting requirements have the potential to impose significant 
costs on hedge funds,301 and yet the most substantial impact of 
these requirements might be that they raise the curtain on what 
had previously been closely guarded secrets regarding investment 
strategies. 
The third way Dodd–Frank regulates hedge funds is by 
changing the rules governing hedge fund investors. The definition 
of an “accredited investor” under Regulation D will now exclude 
the value of the investor’s primary residence, making it more 
difficult for an investor to qualify.302 Similarly, the definition of a 
“qualified client” will now include an adjustment for inflation, 
making it more difficult for investors to qualify.303 Finally, Dodd–
                                                                                                     
 299. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2012) (abolishing the private advisor 
exemption). Although the general registration requirement kicks in only when 
the fund has more than $150 million in assets under management, the SEC is 
also allowed to define “mid-sized” funds and require them to register, as well. As 
a practical matter, most hedge funds will have to register. Interestingly, Dodd–
Frank exempts venture capital funds from the registration requirement, although 
the legislative text leaves open the question of what constitutes a venture capital 
fund, entrusting formulation of a definition to the SEC. 
 300. See id. § 80b-4(b)(3) (listing the types of required information that 
advisors must maintain).  
 301. But see Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd–Frank 
Act, 9 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 428 (2015) [hereinafter Kaal, Private Fund 
Disclosures] (describing survey results that indicate a low level of compliance 
costs). 
 302. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017) (providing the definition of “accredited 
investor”).  
 303. See id. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (providing the definition of “qualified client”). 
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Frank regulates hedge funds by requiring internal compliance 
measures. Each hedge fund will now be required to implement 
compliance programs and hire a compliance officer.304 Some of 
these regulations might be seen as relatively innocuous, yet when 
combined, they have the potential to dramatically change the way 
hedge funds do business. 
Among the sources of hedge fund material for Dodd–Frank 
were the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 
2009 (“House Bill”)305 in the House and the Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act of 2010 (“Senate Bill”)306 in the Senate. 
Both bills had been the subject of hearings in their respective 
houses. 
1. Action in the House 
The House Bill focused on registration, and the committee 
hearings seem to acknowledge some potential benefits of hedge 
funds as an alternative investment option,307 but they also 
emphasized “potential dangers for systemic risk and investor 
abuse.”308 The SEC had been pushing for increased regulation of 
hedge funds since 2004, and had offered three justifications: 
(1) rapid growth in the industry; (2) ordinary investors were 
exposed through institutional investors; and (3) the number of 
fraud actions against hedge funds had increased.309 These three 
justifications are at least regulatory quackery, for they are not 
symptoms of any actual danger. Hedge fund investors are 
presumed to be sophisticated enough to make decisions without 
the elaborate disclosures mandated by SEC regulations, and some 
                                                                                                     
 304. See id. § 275.206(4)-7 (discussing these compliance requirements). 
 305. H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 306. S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 307. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-686, at 6 (2010) (“[Hedge funds] offer the promise 
of increased market efficiency and job creation.”) (emphasis added). It is not clear 
whether the authors of the Committee Report viewed this promise as real or 
illusory. 
 308. See id. (examining the potential benefits and dangers of hedge funds to 
provide background and explaining the need for legislation). 
 309. See id. (discussing the continuous lack of regulatory monitoring of hedge 
funds). 
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of the increased return must be explained by hedge funds’ lower 
costs because they are exempt. Institutional investors are 
sophisticated, which is why they manage the funds of ordinary 
investors and are bound by fiduciary duties, so ordinary investors 
are already protected. The final SEC justification makes very little 
sense, as it appears that the SEC is already responding to any 
events of fraud. 
Rather than aiming to protect financial markets or investors, 
the real reason the SEC wanted to regulate hedge funds is that 
regulators felt uncomfortable not knowing what hedge funds were 
doing: “At various points in the financial crisis, de-leveraging by 
hedge funds contributed to the strain on financial markets. Since 
these funds were not required to register with regulators, however, 
the government lacked reliable, comprehensive data with which to 
assess this sort of market activity.”310 To be clear, hedge funds were 
reducing their risk by de-leveraging,311 yet regulators became 
concerned because they did not know the details surrounding 
hedge fund activity. The Committee Report notes that the bill 
required registration of hedge fund advisers and provision to the 
SEC of financial information on assets held but claims that the cost 
will be insignificant.312 As discussed below,313 there is reason to 
doubt that claim. 
2. Meanwhile, in the Senate 
Hearings on the Senate Bill present a conflicted view of hedge 
funds. In discussing the Volcker Rule, the Senate Report overlaps 
                                                                                                     
 310. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 37 (2009). 
 311. De-leveraging is the process of selling stocks that have been purchased 
with debt. After making those trades, the hedge fund is less burdened with debt 
which protects investors from loss. Sale of any security will place downward 
pressure on the market, but neither the Committee Report nor the white paper it 
cites provides any support for the contention that selling off highly leveraged 
positions placed any undue strain on the market that would not have otherwise 
existed. Doing so might explain why no hedge fund required a taxpayer bailout. 
 312. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-686, at 12 (2010) (citing CBO estimates). 
 313. See infra Part VI.A (discussing Dodd–Frank’s protection of investors). 
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between banks and hedge funds are presented as problematic314 
but later the Senate Report admits that “bank credit exposures 
to . . . hedge funds are very well secured,” with banks holding 
collateral against “219 percent of their exposure to hedge funds.”315 
Even though the Committee had no evidence that hedge funds 
contributed to the financial crisis, the Senate Report still insisted 
that regulation of hedge funds was essential.316 Why? Because 
regulators did not feel comfortable not having any “precise data 
regarding the size and scope of hedge funds”317 and because 
regulators feared that they might cause problems in the future.318 
The Senate Bill’s registration requirement was supported not 
only by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt319 but also by the 
                                                                                                     
 314. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9 (2010) (“When losses from high-risk activities 
are significant, they can threaten the safety and soundness of individual firms 
and contribute to overall financial instability.”). 
 315. See id. at 33 (citing a quarterly report issued by the Comptroller of the 
Currency). 
 316. See id. at 38 (discussing the importance of transparency in financial 
markets). 
 317. See id. (discussing effects of hedge funds being unregulated). During 
debate on final passage of Dodd–Frank, Representative Frank stated that the 
registration requirement would:  
[P]rovide that all advisers that want to play in the capital markets 
must register and must disclose certain information so that that 
knowledge of what capital is doing, where it is and in what amounts 
will be known by our regulators. . . . It should go a long way of having 
inside information in the role of the regulators of the United States as 
to what is at risk. 
155 CONG. REC. H14419 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
 318. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010) (“While hedge funds are generally 
not thought to have caused the current financial crisis, information regarding 
their size, strategies, and positions could be crucial to regulatory attempts to deal 
with a future crisis.”). 
 319. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
Markets—Part II Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Mr. Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission) (testifying that he would “recommend 
placing hedge funds under SEC regulation in the context of their role as money 
managers and investment advisers”). 
QUACKS OR BOOTLEGGERS 431 
 
AFL–CIO,320 CalPERS,321 the Investment Adviser Association,322 
the Group of Thirty,323 the G–20,324 the Investor’s Working 
Group,325 and the Congressional Oversight Panel.326 That this 
coalition included domestic and international regulators, along 
with a trade association for those already burdened by SEC 
regulation, is not surprising,327 but the coalition supporting 
regulation also included hedge fund industry groups, such as the 
Coalition of Private Investment Companies,328 the Alternative 
                                                                                                     
 320. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
Markets—Part I Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 19 (2009) (statement of Mr. Damon Silvers, Associate General 
Counsel, AFL-CIO) (testifying in support of a “broad, flexible jurisdiction that 
allow[s] the [SEC] to follow changing financial market practices”). 
 321. See Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools Before 
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Congress 78 (2009) (statement of Mr. Joseph Dear, Chief 
Investment Officer, California Public Employees’ Retirement System) (discussing 
the importance of private fund registration). 
 322. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
Markets—Part II Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mr. David Tittsworth, Executive Director and 
Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser Association) (discussing IAA 
support of centralized registration and regulation of hedge fund managers). 
 323. See GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 30 (2009) (recommending registration of managers of private pools of 
capital based on size with some exemptions). 
 324. See G20 WORKING GROUP 1, ENHANCING SOUND REGULATION AND 
STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY 30 (2009) (proposing a framework which would 
require hedge funds to register with and provide certain data to regulators). 
 325. See INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: 
AN INVESTOR’S PERSPECTIVE 5 (2009) (suggesting that regulatory gaps be filled by 
requiring registration of hedge funds, among other things). 
 326. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM 4 
(2009) (discussing recommendations for the regulation of financial institutions). 
 327. A regulator seeking to expand the size and scope of the regulatory state 
is unsurprising, although not necessarily evidence of anything more than 
regulatory quackery. The support of activist investors like the AFL-CIO, 
CalPERS, and the Investors Working Group—created by the Council of 
Institutional Investors—looks more like bootleggers wanting to impose new 
regulatory burdens on the hedge funds who compete with them for control of 
various corporations. Finally, groups like the Investment Adviser Association 
represent investment advisers who already labor under the SEC’s burdensome 
regulation, and are engaged in naked bootlegging by seeking to impose those 
same burdens on their direct competitors. 
 328. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38–39 (2010) 
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Investment Management Association,329 and the Private Equity 
Council.330 
For some, the support of the regulated industry—often only 
portions of it—is an indication of the common sense of the proposal. 
To the contrary, such support is far more likely to be the result of 
existing market participants’ attempting to erect barriers to 
further competition in order to increase market share and profits. 
Alternatively, perhaps these hedge funds are part of the fifty-five 
percent of hedge funds who voluntarily register with the SEC331 
                                                                                                     
Mr. James Chanos, Chairman of the Coalition of Private Investment 
Companies, . . . testified that “private funds (or their advisers) should 
be required to register with the SEC. . . . Registration will bring with 
it the ability of the SEC to conduct examinations and bring 
administrative proceedings against registered advisers, funds, and 
their personnel. The SEC also will have the ability to bring civil 
enforcement actions and to levy fines and penalties for violations.  
The CPIC is described as “a coalition of private investment companies whose 
members and associates are diverse in both size and investment strategies, 
managing or advising an aggregate of over $100 billion in assets.” Coalition of 
Private Investment Companies, MARKETSWIKI, http://www.marketswiki.com/wiki/ 
Coalition_of_Private_Investment_Companies (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 329. See AIMA Supports US Regulatory Reform Proposals, ALTERNATIVE INV. 
MGMT. ASS’N (Jan. 23, 2009), https://www.aima.org/article/aima-supports-us-
regulatory-reform-proposals.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (announcing AIMA 
support for registration of hedge fund managers) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The AIMA website describes the group as “represent[ing] 
the alternative investment industry, with more than 1,800 corporate members in 
over 50 countries. AIMA’s fund manager members collectively manage more than 
$1.8 trillion in assets.” About, ALTERNATIVE INV. MGMT. ASS’N, 
https://www.aima.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 330. See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor 
Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a 
National Insurance Office Before the U.S. H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 43 
(2009) (statement of Mr. Douglas Lowenstein, President/CEO, Private Equity 
Council) (expressing that the PEC takes “no issue with requiring [private equity] 
fund managers to disclose . . . information to the SEC . . .”). The PEC—now 
renamed the American Investment Council—is “an advocacy and resource 
organization established to develop and provide information about the private 
investment industry and its contributions to the long-term growth of the U.S. 
economy and retirement security of American workers.” About the Council, AM. 
INV. COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcouncil.org/the-council/about-the-council/ 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 331. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 73 (2010) (discussing the amount of hedge 
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and want their competitors to be similarly burdened by regulation. 
Of course, the fact that most hedge funds voluntarily register 
indicates that hedge fund investors are more than capable of 
demanding registration if they wish. 
The Senate Bill also included hedge fund reporting 
requirements out of an alleged desire for openness and 
transparency.332 These provisions were supported by the same 
coalition of regulators and industry groups.333 The reports that the 
SEC would be authorized to mandate were to be kept confidential, 
exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests,334 but they 
would still impose financial burdens as hedge funds would be 
required to gather, maintain, and regularly transmit the data. 
More importantly, once the data is collected in one format, the 
likelihood of it being inadvertently revealed or intentionally stolen 
increases significantly. 
Both the House and Senate Bills impose real burdens on hedge 
funds. The sponsors identify a host of scary bogeymen as 
justification for the regulations, yet their arguments boil down to 
a fear of the future and a desire for more government control.335 
                                                                                                     
funds that have already voluntarily registered with the SEC). 
 332. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
Markets—Part I  Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 89 (2009) (statement of Mr. Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, 
Investment Company Institute) (“[T]he Capital Markets Regulator should require 
nonpublic reporting of information, such as investment positions and strategies, 
that could bear on systemic risk and adversely impact other market 
participants.”); Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
Markets—Part II Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
111th Cong. 164 (2009) (statement of Mr. Richard Ketchum, Chairman and CEO, 
Financial Industry Regulatory Association) (“The absence of transparency about 
hedge funds and their investment positions is a concern.”). 
 333. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 73–74 (2010) (noting Senate hearing 
statements and testimony regarding industry group and regulator support for 
registration and oversight). 
 334. See id. at 74 (discussing Section 404 of the Senate’s bill requiring private 
fund records be confidential). 
 335. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-19, at 17–18 (2009)  
Attracted by high returns, institutional investors, such as pension 
funds and university endowments, are placing more of their money in 
hedge funds. And, as hedge funds invested in the risky subprime 
mortgage market, some high-profile funds incurred major losses, and 
several have filed for bankruptcy. As a result, “rank-and-file workers, 
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Regulation is necessary because, otherwise, how will regulators 
know what private individuals are doing with their money? The 
lack of any identifiable problem to be solved makes these 
regulatory efforts look like quackery, at the very least, or even 
bootlegging. 
VI. Who is Dodd–Frank Protecting? 
Given the legislative history of Dodd–Frank, it is difficult to 
conclude that Dodd–Frank’s regulation of hedge funds is likely to 
yield positive outcomes, but perhaps we are being too hasty. It may 
be worth considering that, perhaps, the sponsors were merely 
inarticulate in describing its benefits. Perhaps the current 
business practices of hedge funds are harmful in ways as yet 
unidentified. As discussed above,336 the primary concerns of Dodd–
Frank were consumer protection and avoidance of systemic risk. 
Taking the criticisms of hedge funds at face value, hedge fund 
business practices might be concerning, as hedge funds are known 
for short-selling, purchasing on margin, high levels of risk, and 
levels of secrecy that could raise red flags regarding potentially 
fraudulent activity, insider trading, etc. Hedge funds might also be 
more likely to pursue short-term profits at the expense of the 
long-term stability of the businesses hedge funds invest in. 
Against these potential claims of risks imposed by hedge funds 
and regulation under Dodd–Frank are two alternative arguments. 
First, that the concerns about hedge funds are illusory, that hedge 
funds simply do not pose the level of risk asserted by critics.337 
Second, that even if critics are correct, the particular form of 
regulation chosen by the authors of Dodd–Frank and the SEC are 
ill-suited to eliminate or even mitigate the risk.338 
                                                                                                     
retirees, and others may be unwittingly exposed to hedge fund losses.”  
(quoting MARK JICKLING & ALISON A. RAAB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33746, 
HEDGE FUND FAILURES 2 (2006)). 
 336. See supra Part V.A (discussing the overarching goals of Dodd–Frank 
legislation). 
 337. See Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization, supra note 
254, at 3 (“[T]here is an absence of evidence pointing to hedge funds as a 
contributing factor in the recent financial panic.”). 
 338. See Antti Petajisto, Hedge Funds After Dodd–Frank, N.Y.U. STERN (July 
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A. Investors 
The first and most obvious group that might stand to lose 
because of the business practices of hedge funds are those investors 
who entrust their limited investment capital to hedge fund 
managers and their innovative investment strategies.339 Without 
transparency, investors might not have enough information to 
properly judge the riskiness of their investments. Many of the 
traditional concerns that arise in principal/agent relationships 
arise in the context of hedge funds, such as information 
asymmetries that can lead managers to pursue their own ends 
rather than the ends of investors. Similar to the disclosure and 
registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 
Securities Exchange Act, perhaps more information will lead to 
better investment decisions.340 
Of course, the fact that some information is better than no 
information does not answer the question of what is the proper 
level of information. After all, information is almost certain to be 
subject to increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal 
benefits.341 As the amount of information required increases, the 
likely benefits decrease and costs increase.342 Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                     
19, 2010, 3:41 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/ 
hedge-funds-after-doddfrank.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (discussing the 
broad implications of the passage of Dodd–Frank) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 339. As an interesting legislative note, the 111th Congress saw a bill entitled 
the “Investor Protection Act of 2009,” but the Committee Report mentioned hedge 
funds only twice. On page 52, it mentioned that hedge funds were among the 
victims of Bernie Madoff. H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 52 (2010). It also mentioned 
hedge funds on page 53, in the title of a report previously sent to the SEC about 
the Madoff scandal. Id. at 53. 
 340. This benefit may be overstated, however, as shareholders will have 
diverse ways of obtaining the type of information that is required by the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, and now by Dodd–Frank. Moreover, it is difficult to see how disclosure 
to the SEC, rather than directly to investors, helps those investors make 
important decisions. 
 341. See supra Part III.A.2 (noting how the value of further regulation 
decreases as more of it is implemented). 
 342. In fact, it is possible for the marginal benefit to be negative after a given 
point. As but one example, even water will overload the human body and cause 
death if enough is consumed. This is easily seen with information, as information 
overload makes it impossible to process even the most useful information. 
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increase in cost is likely to follow a non-linear path, potentially 
increasing geometrically or exponentially along some range. Even 
conceding benefits to be gained from increased disclosures, the 
exact value of those disclosures is unclear and there are likely to 
be high costs; at some point, the costs will overtake the benefits 
and render the disclosures harmful to both hedge funds, investors, 
and society. This is especially the case for the kind of sophisticated 
investor allowed to invest in hedge funds,343 who presumably 
already possesses the most important information or at least 
knows how to demand what information is lacking. 
Wulf Kaal has begun to study the disclosure requirements and 
ask important questions about the burden imposed by them.344 His 
initial results appear sound and indicate relatively low costs,345 so 
it is possible that the Dodd–Frank disclosure requirements are low 
enough that they are still largely beneficial. Then again, it is not 
clear that the type of sophisticated investor that invests in hedge 
funds requires the type of information provided by Dodd–Frank, so 
the benefits might be even lower than minimal costs, rendering the 
disclosures inefficient and harmful. Furthermore, Kaal’s initial 
results are preliminary and have a relatively low response rate.346 
It is possible that the responding hedge funds are a representative 
sample, but it is at least plausible that those funds who find the 
disclosure requirements onerous and costly have less ability to 
respond to the survey, as their resources are occupied fulfilling the 
disclosure requirements.347 
                                                                                                     
 343. See MARK JICKLING & ALISON A. RAAB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33746, 
HEDGE FUND FAILURES 1 (2006) (“[Hedge fund investors] are presumed to be 
capable of understanding the risks and bearing the losses of such investment.”). 
 344. See Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 301, at 429 (“Private fund 
advisers have traditionally opposed enhanced transparency of the funds they 
manage, arguing that the mandatory private fund disclosure requirements in 
Form PF could inappropriately burden the private fund industry.”). 
 345. See id. at 428 (“The key findings of this study indicate that the majority 
of private fund advisers responding to the survey incurred less than $10,000.00 
to prepare their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent 
annual Form PF filings at about half the initial cost.”). 
 346. See id. at 436 (“The overwhelming majority of the population did not 
participate in the survey.”). 
 347. See id. at 1436–38 (identifying the possibility of selection bias in the 
study, and the possibility that the sample is not representative). 
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In the end, it is far from clear that Dodd–Frank’s disclosure 
requirements are beneficial to investors.348 There are likely 
benefits, although their magnitude is uncertain. There are 
certainly costs, and while they may be small, the uncertain nature 
of the benefits makes it impossible to determine whether Dodd–
Frank helps or hurts investors. Most of Dodd–Frank’s remaining 
regulation of hedge funds does not implicate investor protection,349 
so Dodd–Frank seems to provide only weak protection for 
investors. 
B. Public 
Perhaps the real benefit of Dodd–Frank’s regulation of hedge 
funds is in its protection of the financial system, as a whole. By 
protecting the integrity of the financial system, reducing systemic 
risk, Dodd–Frank might protect both investors and the public, at 
large, from the catastrophic consequences of another financial 
meltdown. There are two significant problems, however, with this 
justification of hedge fund regulation under Dodd–Frank. First, it 
is anything but clear that hedge funds pose the type of systemic 
risk that led to the meltdown,350 especially when considering the 
impact of much larger financial entities like Lehman Brothers. 
Second, disclosure and registration requirements alone provide 
little hope for decreasing systemic risk.351 
                                                                                                     
 348. Dodd–Frank’s redefinition of accredited investors and qualified clients 
might protect some investors, but only by making it harder for them to invest 
voluntarily with a hedge fund. It is therefore a protection that presumes a need 
for protection, a tautology. 
 349. See Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 301, at 472 (“[T]he 
industry’s concerns that mandatory private fund adviser registration and 
disclosure requirements could inappropriately burden investment advisers seem 
to be mostly unfounded.”). 
 350. See Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization, supra note 
254, at 3 (“[Hedge funds] play no part in the leading analyses of the causes of the 
crisis by prominent academics and journalists.”); see also S. REP. 111-176, at 237 
(2010) (“Hedge funds have not been identified as a cause of the financial crisis 
and investors in failed funds were not bailed out.”). 
 351. See Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization, supra note 
254, at 12 (“Disclosure may provide proprietary information to other hedge funds, 
and may have a further untoward consequence of increasing systemic risk if all 
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Hedge funds did not fail in noticeably dramatic fashion during 
the last crisis, nor did they fail with relatively high frequency.352 
Similarly, the fact that hedge funds “manage only a small 
proportion of the investment universe, particularly as compared to 
banks’ assets, and are far less leveraged than banks”353 indicates 
that hedge funds should not be our primary concern. However, it 
is possible that, although only a small portion of the investment 
universe, the practices of hedge funds pose a risk far in excess of 
their size; they may punch above their weight, as it were, in 
disrupting financial markets.354 For example, hedge funds compete 
by offering above-market returns which, by necessity, means 
accepting above-market risks—pushing the envelope, as it were.355 
For most small hedge funds, their size would keep them from 
creating systemic risk, but some large hedge funds could 
potentially add to systemic risk if their investment choices pushed 
too far into risky territory.356 
Some specific ways in which hedge funds might be seen to 
contribute to systemic risk are by short selling,357 selling on 
                                                                                                     
funds imitate the disclosed trading strategy of more profitable funds.”). 
 352. See id. at 3 (noting that hedge funds were not the cause of the financial 
crisis, nor did the financial crisis necessarily cause hedge funds to shut down at 
a greater rate than they normally would). 
 353. Id. at 6. 
 354. See id. (“High-risk, and contrarian financial bets produce[] extraordinary 
financial returns, bringing enhanced scrutiny to their activity.”). 
 355. See id. (“Often lurking in the background of the increased scrutiny [is] 
the suspicion that the outsized returns were obtained by questionable means.”). 
 356. See id. at 18 (“Individual countries can create systemic risk by not 
adequately regulating local institutions, specifically, hedge funds.”). 
 357. See 155 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Kaufman)  
Everyone believes the SEC needs to put on the brakes and stop those 
who dump millions of shares they don’t own to drive prices down. 
Abusive short selling amounts to gasoline on the fire for distressed 
stocks and distressed markets. Abusive short selling happens when 
traders and hedge funds sell stock shares they don’t have and won’t be 
able to deliver . . . . 
See id. at S3121 (statement of Sen. Isakson)  
What happened was hedge funds and other traders coming in to cash 
in were taking the downward spiral of stocks and banks and financial 
institutions in the country and making money off the demise and the 
decline of those stocks, all because there was no protection so that they 
QUACKS OR BOOTLEGGERS 439 
 
margin, taking high-risk positions, and pursuing short-term 
profits. Notice, however, that many of these practices have 
significant social benefits as well as costs.358 For example, while 
short selling can put downward pressure on the market and create 
incentives to exaggerate problems in the market—potentially 
destabilizing the market—short selling on legitimate and truthful 
information provides essential signals to the market, increasing 
the odds that assets are properly priced and deterring the 
formation of bubbles.359 Some scholars have argued that 
short-sellers are engaged in a practice that is essential to the 
health of markets, rather than being detrimental to them.360 The 
ability to sell short provides additional opportunities for 
investment profits, increasing the incentive to identify new 
information about those opportunities.361 More importantly, it 
provides incentives for investors to bet against bubbles when the 
available information indicates that prices are too high.362 
Similarly, the dominant paradigm teaches that short-term 
profit seeking is detrimental to businesses, and that it can 
translate to instability in the market.363 However, it is not clear 
that long-term profits are always preferable to short-term profits. 
                                                                                                     
couldn’t feed off a downward spiral. The uptick rule, as well explained 
by the Senator from Delaware, simply  provides a cushion to discourage 
those who would exploit a dangerous and difficult market and make 
money at the expense of the American people. 
 358. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul C. Tetlock, Short 
Selling and the News: A Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 645, 647 (2010) (“The free availability of short selling can improve 
share price accuracy.”). 
 359. See id. (“Short selling can make prices better reflect already-existing 
information relevant to making such predictions when such information is 
disparately spread among all the potential traders in the market.”). 
 360. See id. (explaining that short selling increases traders’ incentives to 
evaluate new information and allows for more accurate future predictions). 
 361. See id. at 647–49 (suggesting that short selling increases the chances of 
seeing a profit). 
 362. See id. at 650–52 (“If a bubble begins to form with respect to an issuer, 
persons who trade on the basis of a rational evaluation of future cash flows will 
all be pessimists . . . and bubbles would in turn be more likely to burst before 
growing too large.”). 
 363. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the 
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003) 
(discussing the different goals achieved by long or short-term profit seeking). 
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In some cases, pursuit of long-term goals can be more destructive 
of corporate value than short-term goals.364 
Extensive purchases on margin and other risky behavior could 
increase the risk to investors, yet those investors are compensated 
for that risk in a competitive investment market.365 Actions in 
pursuit of additional profits both lead to the additional risk and 
are required to compensate for that risk.366 This might seem like a 
problem, but it is nothing more than an innovation designed to fill 
a gap in the investment universe left open by existing financial 
services firms. Without hedge funds, investors would invest at 
presumably lower risk but also lower returns. 
More importantly, the relatively small market share enjoyed 
by hedge funds indicates that the risk they generate is unlikely to 
translate into systemic risk.367 The saga of Long Term Capital 
Management is used as a counterexample, but the imposition of 
government favors—in the form of a bailout—leave us with only ex 
post assurances by those who prefer greater regulation that the 
bailout was necessary.368 In the meantime, other large hedge fund 
failures, such as Amaranth, imposed no widespread burdens on the 
financial system.369 And, it bears mentioning that most hedge 
funds are not as large as Long Term Capital Management and 
                                                                                                     
 364. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term 
Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1593 (2015) (“The use of bargain repurchases 
to benefit long-term shareholders can lead to ‘costly contraction’: managers 
seeking to buy back stock at a low price may give up economically valuable projets 
to fund the repurchase”); Id. at 1607 (“Managers serving long-term shareholders 
may increase the size of the firm through the spread of overpriced equity, even 
though the expansion may destroy economic value.”). 
 365. See Margarethe Rammerstorfer, Risk Acceptance and Regulatory Risk, 
10 COMPETITION & REG. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 235, 236 (2009) (noting that the 
level of risk is accounted for when pricing risky investments, indicating they will 
cost less than a more sound investment). 
 366. See supra Part IV (discussing the trade-off between riskier investments 
and the potential for greater profit). 
 367. See supra Part IV.B (noting that increased size is unlikely to increase 
the chances of systemic risk). 
 368. See supra Part IV.B (noting that Long Term Capital Management and 
Amaranth were used by quacks and bootleggers). 
 369. See Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization, supra note 
254, at 3 (“The collapse of the large hedge fund, Amaranth, during the 2007–08 
crisis did not spark contagion in financial markets.”). 
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Amaranth. It is, therefore, far from clear that hedge funds pose 
enough systemic risk to justify the costs of regulation. 
Even conceding the existence of systemic risk, however, it is 
far from clear that Dodd–Frank’s regulatory regime can minimize 
that risk in any way. Just as disclosure and registration 
requirements provide little protection to investors without 
meaningful enforcement power370—to say nothing of the need to 
define the criteria for intervention—those requirements also 
provide little protection to the system as a whole. The best that can 
be said is that Congress imposed the new requirements because it 
had no idea how to properly regulate hedge funds371 and, as a 
result, set up the current regime only to gather data in order to 
facilitate future regulation. However, it is also possible that, while 
seemingly ineffective to address Dodd–Frank’s stated goals, the 
current regulatory regime furthers goals not clearly stated—the 
goals of financial bootleggers. 
VII. Bootleggers in Dodd–Frank 
If Dodd–Frank’s stated regulatory goals are unobtainable, it 
might just mean that quackery is at work. After all, Romano and 
Bainbridge have shown that its corporate governance regime is 
largely quackery.372 Then again, just as Romano and Bainbridge 
point out the special interests—policy entrepreneurs373—who 
benefit from the corporate governance regulations, there are 
groups that stand to gain from Dodd–Frank’s hedge fund 
                                                                                                     
 370. See id. at 12 (“Disclosure may provide proprietary information to other 
hedge funds, and may have a further untoward consequence of increasing 
systemic risk if all funds imitate the disclosed trading strategy of more profitable 
funds.”). 
 371. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. S1061 (daily ed., Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of 
Sen. Levin) (relating concerns by a law-professor witness at Congressional 
hearings that no one knows what role hedge funds played in the financial crisis). 
 372. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (discussing claims that 
Dodd-Frank does not accomplish what it was meant to). 
 373. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1528 (noting that policy entrepreneurs are needed to help prevent future financial 
crises); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1816 (“Key policy entrepreneurs were able to 
hijack the legislative process to advance a long-standing political agenda.”). 
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regulation. The existence of those groups and their involvement in 
the legislative and regulatory process indicate that there may be a 
separate, non-public set of goals and purposes for Dodd–Frank’s 
hedge fund regulation, and that those goals are being met.374 In 
other words, those calling the shots may be bootleggers instead of 
quacks. 
The minority members of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs provided a handy list of possible 
bootlegging reasons for the chosen regulatory regime. “It is likely 
that investors will treat SEC registration as an SEC seal of 
approval.”375 As a result, those hedge funds engaged in 
borderline-unethical behavior might be able to hide their shady 
practices behind the veneer of respectability that registration and 
disclosure provide.376 Similarly, given the SEC’s inability to 
adequately monitor those entities and managers already being 
supervised,377 adding additional subjects of regulation could lead 
to even less stringent enforcement of SEC rules and allow 
marginal firms to get away with dubious business practices. 
It is possible, if unlikely, that shady hedge funds are the 
bootleggers at work here; it would certainly fit nicely with the 
terminology. However, two other groups stand to gain significantly 
from the choice of regulatory regime: large financial institutions; 
                                                                                                     
 374. See Romano, Making of Quack Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 
1524 (insinuating opinions on policy change come with political motives).  
 375. See S. REP. 111-176, at 237 (2010) (stating minority views). 
 376. For example, Bernie Madoff reassured skeptical investors by reminding 
them that the SEC had inspected his firm. See SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE 
OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD 
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME—PUBLIC VERSION 427 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (‘‘In addition, private entities who conducted due 
diligence stated that Madoff represented to them that the SEC had examined his 
operations when they raised issues with him about his strategy and returns.’’). 
 377. Testimony by Mary Schapiro, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General 
Government of the House Committee on Appropriations (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts031710mls.htm (lsat visited Feb. 17, 
2018) (“It is important to note, however, that even with an increase in the number 
of exams these additional resources will enable us to conduct, we anticipate 
examining only nine percent of SEC registered investment advisers and 17 
percent of investment company complexes in FY2011.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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and large hedge funds. Financial institutions might desire to see 
hedge funds regulated as a way of recapturing marginal investors 
who had diverted some or all of their investment capital away from 
traditional financial services firms to hedge funds. Larger hedge 
funds might also have seen Dodd–Frank as an opportunity to 
impose disclosure burdens that would be highly burdensome to 
smaller hedge fund start-ups, curbing competition within hedge 
funds and consolidating market power with the established 
players in the market. 
A. What Would Big Finance Gain? 
Compared to large financial services firms, hedge funds are 
typically quite small. They are not without their advantages, 
however, possessing an ability to innovate that financial services 
firms lack. Those innovations and the ability to adopt them with 
haste have made hedge fund investments a substitute—albeit an 
imperfect one—for investments with traditional firms. Those 
innovations are also riskier, which will make hedge-fund investing 
too risky for some investors, but, to the extent that the profit 
differential is high enough, some investors choose hedge funds and 
provide competition for financial services firms. Competition is 
good for consumers but is not welcomed by firms who must 
constantly respond to competition or risk losing market share. 
Large financial services firms would likely love to innovate but 
are prohibited from doing so by regulation. This innovation-stifling 
regulation comes in multiple forms, but two forms are most 
important for our purposes. First, there are simply some things 
that financial services firms are simply not allowed to do. To the 
extent that hedge funds can cross those lines, they can exploit 
opportunities for profit and pull investment dollars away. Second, 
and more importantly, the disclosures required of those financial 
services firms means that any successful innovation is likely to be 
adopted quickly by all other market participants, similar to a 
price-taker market.378 So, even where innovation is possible, the 
                                                                                                     
 378. Basic economic theory teaches that, in a price-taker market, each market 
player produces such a small portion of the total supply that no single player has 
any market power. These markets tend to exhibit zero economic profit and 
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inability of financial services firms to capture the long-term 
benefits of that innovation means that there will be less 
innovation. Once again, a hedge fund that has no disclosure 
requirements can keep its innovations secret and enjoy additional 
profits for longer periods; investors seeking those additional profits 
will transfer some of their investment funds away from traditional 
firms and into hedge funds. 
Dodd–Frank does little to prohibit any particular innovation 
by hedge funds, so there still exist areas into which hedge funds 
may venture that their larger, more established cousins may not. 
Certain profit centers might still be exploited by hedge funds, 
generally, as compared to financial services firms. By mandating 
the type of intense disclosure that Dodd–Frank requires, however, 
the regulations cut into hedge fund profit margins by the amount 
required to create and transmit the disclosures. These are not 
insignificant costs, particularly to smaller hedge funds.379  
Possibly more important, however, is the disclosures 
themselves. While not a complete piercing of the secrecy previously 
enjoyed by hedge funds, preparing and disclosing the information 
to government means potentially hundreds or thousands of eyes 
will see proprietary information. There are numerous ways that 
information could find its way into competitors’ hands. Even if 
current strategies are never disclosed, the increased likelihood of 
innovations being revealed means a reduction in the benefits to 
innovation and, as a result, fewer innovations. Over time, that will 
reduce the competitive advantage enjoyed by hedge funds. As the 
increased profits decline, marginal investors will return to the 
                                                                                                     
relative uniformity between producers. Any innovation which shifts costs and 
increases profits is assumed to disperse quickly throughout the market, returning 
economic profits to zero rapidly. Importantly, this does not mean that no 
innovation takes place in price-taker markets, just that the incentives for 
innovating are less than they would be in a market where the economic profits to 
innovation were positive and durable. The financial services industry is not a 
price-taker market. However, the transparency in the market facilitated by (or, 
some might say, caused by) government disclosure requirements allows for rapid 
adoption of successful innovations by competitors, lessening the incentives to 
expend resources searching for profitable innovations. 
 379. See generally PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES 
REGULATION FAILS (2015) (arguing that crisis legislation favors established and 
larger financial institutions over smaller and innovative ones because regulatory 
costs are differentially felt in the industry, directly impacting competition). 
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relatively lower risk of established firms and established 
strategies. 
To say that financial services firms would prefer to inhibit 
their competitors—even small ones—is not to disparage them but 
to admit that they are rational participants in a market heavily 
influenced by government regulators. However, that does not 
answer the question of why Dodd–Frank? One possible answer is 
that knowing that the torches and pitchforks were already out for 
them, and that they were unlikely to escape some additional 
regulatory burden, firms engaged in rent-seeking mode. Some 
commentators are convinced that the rent-seeking of the largest 
banks was successful, given the increased consolidation in banking 
since the financial collapse.380 Another avenue of rent-seeking by 
these firms could have been to take advantage of the skepticism 
with which many politicians and the public view hedge funds and, 
in a perverse way, level the playing field. 
B. Intra-Industry Conflict? 
We should not assume that only one set of bootleggers is in 
play here—or anywhere—as others might have similar incentives 
to curb competition. Specifically, one set of hedge funds might have 
an incentive to disadvantage another. Dodd–Frank imposes 
disclosure requirements that are more easily dispersed in a larger 
hedge fund than in a small one. Those requirements should 
therefore cause a greater decrease in profit margin for small hedge 
funds, driving many out of business and deterring many others 
from entering the market. Some of the resulting pool of unattached 
investment dollars will return to traditional investment vehicles, 
but some will redound to the benefit of those hedge funds that 
remain. 
It is also possible that pure profit might not be the only driving 
force behind this conflict. In the search for increased investment 
                                                                                                     
 380. See Todd Zywicki, The Dodd–Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We Freer? 
(Geo. Mason U. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series 15-54, 6–7 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704076 (arguing that the 
post-crisis period produces a codification and consolidation of government 
discretion, making it a long-term element of the economy and society).  
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returns, some methods are more sustainable than others. Those 
strategies that have provided the foundation for larger and 
longer-lasting hedge funds may have been the low-hanging fruit, 
with newer upstarts venturing into increasingly risky waters. That 
increased risk provides an easy target for political opponents and 
established hedge funds may have seen a way to pare back the 
more adventurous elements in the industry in order to blunt those 
political attacks. It also adds to those established hedge funds’ 
profit margin, so the political and the pecuniary might coincide 
nicely. 
C. Any Other Bootleggers Hiding? 
The very nature of bootleggers is that they stay in the 
shadows, hidden from view; identifying one says nothing about the 
existence of others.381 For example, pointing a finger of suspicion 
at large financial services firms does not let larger hedge funds off 
the hook, for both have incentives to push for Dodd–Frank-type 
regulations. There may also be other, less-obvious candidates for 
bootlegger status. As time passes and the full impact of Dodd–
Frank is realized, more details may become clear regarding those 
who benefit from the apparently ill-conceived hedge fund 
regulations. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Hedge funds are more risky than traditional investment 
vehicles, but that is the nature of financial markets when greater 
returns are sought. Those who view hedge funds as a danger to the 
stability of our financial markets have not made their case, and 
they certainly have not provided evidence to support their claims. 
Moreover, even if not exaggerated, the risks of hedge funds are 
almost certainly not going to be remedied by Dodd–Frank’s 
regulatory regime. It is possible—even plausible—that those 
designing the regulations are simply bad at what they do. After all, 
                                                                                                     
 381. See supra Part III.B (discussing the roll of, and difficulty in identifying, 
bootleggers). 
QUACKS OR BOOTLEGGERS 447 
 
government regulation prior to the recent financial meltdown was 
poorly designed to deal with the risks that threatened the financial 
system. If mere negligence is to blame, then Dodd–Frank is the 
source of more than one form of regulatory quackery. 
Unfortunately, there is an even less favorable possibility, that 
the regulations will operate as designed to advance less 
public-minded goals. Legislators and regulators may have acted 
innocently but in concert with financial bootleggers who stand to 
gain from requiring disclosure of competitors’ trading practices, 
among other things. Imposing costs on competitors is a 
long-standing (if unfortunate) tradition in rent-seeking; requiring 
disclosures that take away a competitors’ advantage at innovation 
would be a simple variation on a theme. Consistent with the 
bootlegger and Baptist theory, the regulations were championed 
publicly by those citing the moral and ethical benefits but the 
primary benefit will likely be those with financial motives. 
Moreover, the regulations are precisely the type predicted by 
Yandle—simple and easy to enforce. 
